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Summary
This research report is a broad-based study that seeks to understand the
structural and developmental processes that characterise the security sector in
Francophone Africa. 
Although each country has a distinct political history and tradition, similarities in
the security apparatus, rooted in its inheritance from the colonial and post-colonial
periods, can be found between Francophone countries in Africa. In the former
French colonies, there are similarities to the French security system which are
very strong on the normative side, such as the legal and institutional framework or
the defence and security actors. However, even if these Francophone African
countries borrow a lot from an originally French security system in terms of the
institutional design of their security apparatus, they deviate considerably from it in
terms of daily practice. 
The issue at stake in this paper is to highlight the kind of institutional framework
prevailing in this set of countries and the specific considerations that international
assistance will have to take into account. The paper also analyses briefly the
difference between Anglophone and Francophone security systems. 
Finally, it makes some recommendations that might assist the security sector
reform policy agenda and donor and recipient responses to the security
challenges faced in Francophone Africa.
Keywords: Security Sector Reform (SSR); Francophone Africa; armed forces;
Military; Police forces
Niagalé Bagayoko is a Fellow of IDS. She is a political scientist with a doctorate
from the University of Paris. She has published widely, including a 2003 book on
US and French security policies in Africa (Afrique: Les Stratégies Française et
Américaine) and three other volumes. She is currently researching sector reform
in Francophone African countries and has led field research in the Central African
Republic, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal. She has also studied interagency and
multilateral processes in post-conflict environments; sub-regional security
mechanisms in West Africa (ECOWAS); and African conflict-management
mechanisms.
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1 In SSR terminology, the word oversight relates to ‘the concept of separate branches of government or
agencies exercising authority over one another’.
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11
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
1 Introduction
This research report is a broad-based study that seeks to understand the
structural and developmental processes that characterise the security sector in
Francophone Africa. It aims to provide a systematic overview and understanding
of the actors involved, the structures, and how security systems function: former
French territories (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Central Africa, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) are reviewed here.
Although each country has a distinct political history and tradition, similarities in
the security apparatus, rooted in its inheritance from the colonial and post-colonial
periods, can be found between countries that belong to Francophone Africa. 
Going beyond the various historical, constitutional, legal and regulatory
instruments that serve as the framework for security sector governance, this study
aims to provide a critical perspective on the Francophone security sector in the
present day, by raising issues that can contribute to a better understanding of the
challenges that it faces. The purpose is to map and analyse how security
institutions work in Francophone Africa and how the different actors (security
providers as well as overseeing actors) relate to each other. In addition to
enquiring into the respective missions of the different security forces, this study
thus provides information on the role played by the different institutions; their
structure, organisation and culture; their mutual relationships and the kind of
control exercised on them. The sphere of activities to be covered is wide, and
thus a certain selectivity has been used in order to capture the general dynamics,
the actors, the structures and the organisation that shapes the security sector. 
Little about the security sector in Francophone Africa has been documented or
written down. Carrying out documentary research into the institutional security
development in Francophone Africa is therefore a real challenge: there is little
information and few materials – either primary or secondary sources, that are
available in the public domain. Only a few states have compiled the statutory rules
of their Public service,2 and texts relating to the special statute that characterise
most of the defence and security forces in Francophone African states are
unavailable. The same applies to all the texts which establish new democratic
institutions: even if an official journal exists, its publication has often become
increasingly erratic, or has been taken out of circulation altogether. The same
goes for the national conferences whose minutes have currently become difficult
to obtain. As a consequence, priority must be given to European or North
American research or documentation centres when carrying out documentary
research into the security sector of an African Francophone country. This report is
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mostly based on a literature review of the scarce existing resources. In addition,
data was collected on the ground during field trips to the Central African Republic
(CAR), Cameroon, Mali and Senegal that has been very useful.
To adequately deal with the problems of the security sector in Francophone Africa,
and to appreciate what its assessment needs are, this paper is divided into six
sections: 
z Firstly, it starts with a general historical overview of the Francophone security
sector in terms of its origins and development, from its inception in the colonial
period to independence;
z Second, constitutional provisions, as well as the other legislative instruments
regulating the security sector (principles, rules, and actors including the role of
the Parliaments), are reviewed;
z Third, there is an outline of the structural organisation and the role and
missions of the defence and security forces (special units of the armed forces,
police forces, municipal police, gendarmerie forces; intelligence services;
paramilitary forces such as customs and private security companies);
z Fourth, funding provisions are outlined;
z Fifth, the military schools and police academies which can be found in
Francophone Africa are presented;
z Sixth, the differences between Anglophone and Francophone Security
Systems are analysed. 
Finally, the paper draws some conclusions and makes recommendations that
might assist the security sector reform (SSR) policy agenda, and donor and
recipient responses to the security challenges faced in Francophone
environments.
3 The French Union was made up of the AOF and the AEF. 
4 Most of the African regiments who served in the British colonial army mainly included soldiers who
originated from the territory in which they were assigned. 
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2 Heritage from the colonial and
post-colonial periods
There is a lot of coherence between the former French colonies reviewed in this
research report, which were all governed in the same way. In all Francophone
African states, the security system is a direct heritage from the structures put in
place under colonial rule and maintained, from the 1960s onwards, by
independent governments. 
2.1 France and its African colonies
The Francophone African defence apparatus originates from French colonial troops
(Troupes Coloniales). From 1822 to 1900, both French and indigenous troops were
initially designated as Marines (Troupes de Marine) and administered by the Navy
Ministry, even if they were mostly made up of infantry, and also included artillery
units. Their insignia was a badge with an anchor that continued to be worn after the
Troupes de Marine became the Colonial Troops in 1900. The French colonial
troops are different from the Armée Coloniale which include North African
regiments such as the Zouave, the Saphis, the Goumiers, and the Foreign Legion.
However, some African troops (Goumiers guard in Mali, Saphis in Senegal) were
part of both structures. The French colonial troops were divided into:
z The French long service volunteers (French troops from France serving in the
colonies): in Africa, those troops were assigned to serve in the garrison of the
AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française – French Western Africa), AEF (Afrique
Equatoriale Française – Equatorial French Africa),3 Madagascar (as well as in
Indochina and New Caledonia);
z The indigenous troops were recruited to any one of the above. These indigenous
troops were serving as part of the French army: they were put under the
supervision of French officers and were designated as Tirailleurs (skirmishers).
There were Tirailleurs in each of the African Francophone countries (Tirailleurs
sénégalais, malgache, etc.) but the generic designation ‘Tirailleurs sénégalais’
was the name given to all West and Central African regiments. 
Whether French or indigenous, these troops were mostly long service regulars.
Contrary to the armed forces of the Anglophone colonies,4 the French colonial
troops recruited soldiers in all African territories under French rule, and used them
in any place, without taking into account their geographical origin. 
In the territories of AOF and AEF, the maintenance of law and order was a
responsibility shared by all the colonial troops. There were two noticeable
exceptions however, with two specialised bodies that were part of the colonial
troops but specifically entrusted with police and law enforcement missions.
5 The coup attempted in Togo in 1963 by some non-commissioned officers is a good example of this
situation: these soldiers did not accept that they were to be excluded from the national Togolese
armed forces. 
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First, the colonial gendarmes. Colonial gendarmes are almost exclusively
established in Senegal. In 1904, the colonial gendarmerie officially began to recruit a
body of African auxiliaries. The appearance of native auxiliaries of the gendarmerie
took place under the following conditions: certain indigenous units were flanked by
the French gendarmes and their police powers were almost non-existent. Officially,
the native auxiliary was a scout and an interpreter. In Cameroon and in Congo only,
the police were supported directly by native forces. Cameroon was one of the rare
territories of Africa endowed with a gendarmerie, created in 1920. After WWI, the
colonial gendarmerie was first in line in the coercive interventions against
independence movements. In some countries, the gendarmerie is a heritage from
both traditional forces and colonial gendarmerie: for instance, in Senegal, the history
of the gendarmerie is closely linked to the story of the so-called ‘Red Guard’ (La
Garde Rouge), which was made up of the Saphis horsemen.
On the territory that would become Mali, Mauritania and Niger, camel troops
(troupes méharistes) were created in 1894, by the Governor of Senegal under the
name of ‘Garde cercle’ and then ‘Garde goume’. 
Some countries, such as Togo, still base their policies on doctrines that were
imported during the colonial period which incorporates military and psychological
control of the population, and aims to fight internal subversion. 
After independence, the Tirailleurs were discharged and joined their new national
armies, or police forces. It is important to note that during the first years after the
independences, most of the new nations did not have an army. Apart from
Guinea, all the newly independent states adopted the status of member-state of
the Franco-African Community – which replaced the French Union in 1958 – and
delegated to the Community their competencies in foreign policy and national
defence. Consequently, former Tirailleurs were part of the armed forces of the
Community and were not responsible to national governments. Initially, there were
no Francophone African national armies (Lavroff 1976). The independent
Francophone African states asked rapidly for the modification of their status for
them to enjoy complete sovereignty. The armed forces of the Community were
then disbanded, and France made available soldiers who had been posted in
other territories, to the states that they originated from. 
Consequently, from 1962 onwards, contingents from the Franco-African
Community formed the first nucleus of the Francophone African armies. However,
this movement did not result in the same kind of military apparatus in every
country. Indeed, the colonial troops, and then the Armed forces of the Community,
did principally recruit from some territories, particularly from those whose
populations were considered ‘good warriors’. Most Francophone soldiers were
recruited in Senegal, Mali, Haute-Volta (former name of Burkina Faso), Togo and
Niger, which consequently inherited bigger contingents than other countries. Some
countries (Mali, Haute-Volta, Togo) were not able (for financial reasons), or willing
(for political reasons, some soldiers being seen as too close to the former colonial
power),5 to integrate all their national soldiers into their new armed forces, whilst
6 Politically well-organised trade unions and students were particularly active in the independence struggle. 
7 French troops who had been permanently stationed in the Central African Republic left the country in 1997. 
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some countries, where only a few soldiers had been recruited by France, had to
recruit new inexperienced soldiers. 
It is worth noting that following the adoption of the Law Deferre in 1956, the
function of policing and law enforcement had been entrusted to indigenous forces
placed under the supervision of local authorities rather than under French
supervision. It was then decided that the colonial territories would have their own
municipal and local police forces, the French general government being only
entrusted with supervising the armed forces and ensuring the territorial defence of
the territories. The objective was to unburden Metropolitan France of all the
operations of ‘maintenance of law and order’, especially against trade unions and
demonstrations by educated youth.6 The legitimacy of the power of the new
autonomous authorities was in fact based on the establishment of national police
forces to control African protesters fighting for independence. The devolvement of
local police forces in the territorial authorities was primarily meant to ensure social
and political pacification. In this respect, there is little doubt that the continuance
of the colonial authoritarian tradition is closely tied to the insoluble social and
economic problems which the new authorities had to face, and this played a major
role in the fast militarisation of policing and law enforcement in the quasi-totality of
the independent states. 
2.2 The ‘special relationship’ between France and Africa after
independence
From independence, France has been more deeply engaged in Africa than any
other Western country (though the USSR, Eastern Europe and Cuba were also
deeply engaged in states ‘of socialist orientation’ during the Cold War period). Any
analysis of the security apparatus in Francophone Africa must bear in mind that
relationships with France are critical to the understanding of the state of the
security sector in a number of Francophone African countries. From the time of
independence, a special relationship has prevailed between the new states and
their former colonial powers (N’Diaye 2007). France kept close and constraining
strategic ties with its former colonies: Paris was tied to them by a system of
diplomatic, economic, cultural, and defence agreements. This special relationship
between France and its former colonies is often referred to as ‘Francafrique’ in the
Francophone literature, this pejorative word pointing out the shadow and
nepotistic practices which used to characterise the relations between French
officials and the post-colonial non-democratic leaders (Wauthier 1995; Smith
1996; Verschave 1998; Petiteville 1996; Charbonneau 2008). 
In the realm of security, French intervention has consisted in ensuring its own
access to base facilities; leading direct ‘stabilising’ interventions; and positioning
military and security personnel and advisers in ministries. The essential
characteristics of the Franco-African security relationship includes defence
agreements (guaranteeing the continual presence of French troops in a number of
Francophone states – Senegal, Djibouti, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire7 – or mutual
8 Whilst most of the specialists of the French African security policy (Barillot 1993; Ango Ela 1996;
Balmond 1998; Chaigneau 1984; Dumoulin 1997; Gounin 2009; Luckham 1982; Gregory 2000; Smith
1996; Charbonneau 2008; Vasset 1997) have systematically and thoroughly analysed the political
processes underlying Franco-African military relationships, one can hardly find a systematic and
detailed assessment of the achievements of more than 40 years of French security cooperation with
Francophone African countries: no detailed lessons learned have been completed, except (to some
extent) in the 1996 and 2002 reports of the Observatoire permanent de la coopération française
(1996, 2002). 
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defence clauses), military advisors and close military and police cooperation
(including the training of officers and the sale of weapons and related equipment).
From the 1960s, Francophone states have suffered the permanent presence of
French troops, when linked to France by a defence agreement and therefore have
been protected from external and in some cases internal aggression, with France
serving as the guarantor of their sovereignty. Consequently, they have not
developed strong military apparatus. In addition, the so-called ‘coopérants’ –
technical advisors (in the defence as well as in the police and justice sector)
permanently deployed in Francophone African countries (for a two to three year
period) have been deeply involved in assisting the newly independent authorities
in putting on its feet a national security apparatus. 
It is very important to stress the fact that the presence of permanently stationed
French troops and the assistance provided by the French ‘coopérants’ on a daily
basis has not prevented the Francophone African states from falling into state-
personalisation processes – where political rulers have politicised, manipulated or
undermined the defence and security forces, notably by setting up parallel but
more powerful forces. On the contrary, it can be argued that the effect of French
cooperation as regards security is weak both in terms of governance and
professionalism. It is doubtful whether French military cooperation really has
enhanced overall security in Francophone Africa: the territory of France’s
Francophone allies has not been protected in a number of cases (Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea, the DRC); national or regional conflicts have not been prevented; the
local population most of the time consider the military and the police forces as
threats rather than as protectors; and those forces are rarely able to fulfil their
missions (protection of the territory as regards the military, protection of law and
order as regards the police forces), due to a lack of professionalism and
equipment. On the contrary, French security policy can be seen as having
contributed to strengthen bad governance in Francophone Africa, security
technical support having mainly been provided to non-democratic regimes. 
A lot should be learnt from the failure of French security cooperation in building up
and reforming African security apparatuses since the independences.8
17
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3 General overview of the security
apparatus in Francophone African
states
Despite having been independent for over 40 years, most of the Francophone
African states have maintained many of the defence and security institutions
imposed by France under colonial rule. A large number of former French colonies
have inherited, from the legacy of the French, a three-tiered security apparatus.
According to existing regulations under this system, national security is meant to
be maintained by the army for external threats, and by both the gendarmerie and
the police for internal security matters. 
3.1 Constitutional frameworks in the former French Colonies
Francophone countries achieved independence between 1958 and 1960. All
former French colony states experienced a single regime party immediately after
independence while a majority of them were then put under a military regime
(Lavroff 1984; Martin 1976; Pabanel 1984). The separation of powers was non-
existent, and the legislative and judiciary powers were highly dependent on the
executive branch which, de facto, enjoyed all rights in terms of security. 
Following the Conference de la Baule in 1990, which aimed to launch a
democratic transition on the continent, most of the Constitutions of the
Francophone African states were reviewed (du Bois de Gaudusson et al. 1997;
Cabanis and Martin 1998a; Roussillion 1995; Daloz and Quentin 1997; Clark and
Gardinar 1996) and went back to Constitutional principles inspired by the 1958
French Constitution, which established the Fifth Republic. The set of Constitutions
(Cabanis and Martin 1998b) adopted during the 1990s espoused the principles of
separation of power, and attributed specific competences to each branch within
the management of the security forces (du Bois de Gaudusson et al. 1997): most
of these Constitutions set out the principles that govern the organisation, use of,
and supervision of the armed forces. 
Below are presented the provisions that relate to security as envisioned by the
1990’s Francophone African Constitutions. We will then focus on the kind of
regimes that have currently been established in Francophone Africa. 
3.2 Constitutional provisions relating to security in the former
French African colonies
A constant feature of the institutional framework in Francophone African countries
is that the President of the Republic presides over all the security apparatus,
whilst the government – mostly through the Ministries of Defence, Interior/Internal
security and Justice – is responsible for implementing security policies. In theory,
there are several bodies which are responsible for coordinating the different
components of the security apparatus. However, in practice, the Presidency has
often kept most of the prerogatives, with some regimes developing abusive
9 The adjective ‘supreme’ was taken directly from the American Constitution: Burkina Faso (article 52 of
the 1991 Constitution, amended in 1997); RCA (article 22 of the 2003 Constitution); Congo (article 78
of the 2002 Constitution); Djibouti (article 32 of the 1992 Constitution); Gabon (article 22 of the 1991
Constitution); Madagascar (article 55 of the 1992 Constitution); Mali (article 44 of the 1992
Constitution); Mauritania (article 34 of 1991, amended in 2006); Chad (article 86 of the 1996
Constitution, amended in 2005). Apart from Djibouti, this entitlement comes with the right to chair ‘the
high councils and committees on national defence’. However, there are six Constitutions that adopt a
different formulation: in Cameroon (article 8 of the 1972 Constitution amended in 1996 and 2008),
Guinea (article 41 of the 1990 Loi Fondamentale), Togo (article 72 of the 1992 Constitution amended
in 2002), Niger (article 52), Senegal (article 39); Congo (article 78 of the 2002 Constitution),
Presidents are simply appointed (as in the French Constitution) as ‘chief of the armed forces’. In Benin
(article 54 of the 1990 Constitution), the President is responsible for ‘the external security of the
Republic’ (Benin is a noticeable exception in Francophone Africa: its regime is definitely presidential,
unlike other Francophone states which have adopted a semi-presidential regime. In Benin, the
Constitution does not mention a prime minister, while the government is supposed to be directly
controlled by the President).
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behaviours. This therefore demonstrates that the 1958 French Fundamental Law
can pave the way to an authoritarian institutional interpretation as well as to a
democratic institutional interpretation.
3.2.1 Power sharing between the President and the government 
Most African Francophone states are semi-presidential regimes. According to the
terms of most Constitutions in Francophone Africa, the executive power is
responsible for taking the necessary measures to guarantee the security and the
integrity of the national territories as well as to protect the population. 
Following the French Constitution, Constitutions in Francophone Africa state that
the President of the Republic is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces,
whilst the prime minister is in charge of implementing the military defence policy.
The President chairs all the ‘organic councils on national defence’ (article 15). He
guarantees national independence, and the integrity of the territory (article 5,
alinea 2). He appoints ‘civil and military employments’ (article 13). Meanwhile, the
government ‘disposes of the administration and the armed forces’ (article 20).
These provisions ensure the supremacy of the President. 
Most of the Francophone African Constitutions appoint the President as the
‘supreme commander in chief of the armed forces’.9 The President also has the
power to appoint civilian and military positions (for instance the Chief of Staff of
the armed forces, as well as other heads of the civilian and military
administration). Appointments to the general staff, and to other bodies of the
military and security units, are made at the council of Ministers. The President can
also hold ‘exceptional powers’ and has the power to declare a state of emergency,
though this can only be after consultation with his Council of Ministers. 
With regards to the government, there is less unity among the Francophone
Constitutions than with regards to the powers of the President of the Republic.
The French assertion stating that the ‘government disposes of the administration
10 Whilst Mali (article 53), Madagascar (article 3) and Mauritania (article 43-3) duplicate the terms in a
similar way, there are three other Constitutions that extend these government’s rights to the security
forces: Burkina (article 61-3), Gabon (article 28-2) and Togo (article 77-1). Some Constitutions do not
mention this responsibility (Djibouti, Guinea, RCA). Other Constitutions only entrust the government
with the ‘administration of the public force’ as in Congo (article 89-1), or with the ‘administration of the
police forces’ as in Chad (article 97-2 and 98-2). In Cameroon, the government is only entrusted with
the disposal of the administration. In Benin, only the President can dispose of the armed forces.
11 Benin (article 101-1); Burkina (article 106-2); Djibouti (article 62-1); Gabon, with a two thirds majority
(article 49); Guinea (article 75); Madagascar (article 82); Mali (article 81); Mauritania (article 58); Chad
(article 127); Togo (article 72). However, the Beninese Constitution states that the President himself
can declare war under ‘exceptional circumstances’ when the Parliament is unable to sit (article 101-2).
12 A number of Francophone African states have a bicameral parliamentary system. However, some
countries have not yet set up their Senate (Cameroon). 
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and the armed forces’ is often taken up by African Constitutions, but with some
variations.10
In summation, according to the Constitutions, the President of the Republic, Supreme
Chief of the armed forces, is able to define the national defence policy, which is
executed by the Minister of the Armed forces, under the aegis of the prime minister.
In practice, the security domain is, to a large extent, the exclusive monopoly of the
President, assisted by a limited circle of civilian and military advisers. 
3.2.2 Legislative mandate: parliamentarian supervision and oversight of the
security services
Since the 1990s, the African Francophone Constitutions have established a
system of separation and collaboration between the executive, the legislative and
the judiciary branches (National Democratic Institute 1999; 1997). According to
the French Constitution, the Parliament is in charge of declaring war and of
ratifying peace agreements. Most Francophone African Constitutions also
acknowledge that the Parliament has the responsibility to declare war.11
Moreover, as in France, most of the Constitutions of Francophone African states
recognise that ‘the fundamental principles of the general organisation of the
national defence’ arise out of the domain of the law. Thus, apart from in Togo
(where there is no definition of the legislative sphere of responsibilities), all the
Constitutions stipulate that their defence policies are passed into law by the
legislature, though only after review by the appropriate committee. 
The Parliament12 may call on the security forces to defend national territory, or to
approve or amend any act relating to new alliances. Most of the time, it has to
approve any engagement of its armed forces abroad. In Benin and Niger, the
Parliament is entitled to adopt bills that ratify any international alliance: this
includes military assistance agreements. 
In most of the countries, the Parliament has the power to monitor the actions of
the government through:
z consideration of the budget (including a faculty to approve the funds that are to
be allocated to various security structures, to revise it downward or upward or
to redirect budget allocations towards other areas);
13 ‘Praetorianism’ can be defined as the political control of a society exercised by the military. 
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z questions to the government;
z Parliamentary standing committees. 
There are standing committees on national defence, security and civil protection,
specifically in charge of the security sector as well as standing committees on
laws and justice. Like all other standing committees, these committees have a
duty to monitor the actions of the government; they may hold audiences with
Ministers, and call before them anyone who needs to be consulted. The
committees receive draft bills from the government but, in some countries such as
Benin and Mali, they may also propose laws on security issues. These
committees are, however, mainly in charge of carrying out surveys and drafting
amendments. They are not investigative bodies, nor are they units that provide
direct control of the activities of the security sector, even if they are allowed to call
on external expertise. 
However, in a number of Francophone African states, there is virtually no
parliamentarian control of the security forces. Despite the formal existence of
parliamentary commissions on security and defence, the Parliaments have more
than often been unable to oversee the security forces. 
3.2.3 Specific provisions against praetorianism13
Most of the Constitutions adopted in Francophone African countries during the
1990s and the 2000s have adopted provisions that aim to prevent the resurgence
of military coups and praetorianism, which used to characterise most of the
regimes during the post-independence period. In Francophone Africa, only
Senegal, Gabon and Cameroon (and to a lesser extent Djibouti) have never
experienced military rule. Consequently, the Constitutions seek to give the
civilians the means to deter and defeat any military attempts at seizing power. 
Such a preoccupation is present in most Constitutional preambles. Almost all the
Constitutions affirm the principles of the democratic rule of law. For instance, the
Togolese and the Beninese Constitutions exclaim in their preambles the ‘strong will
to fight any political regime based on dictatorship and injustice’. Some
Constitutions, such as the Malian and the Chadian ones, remind us of the recent
and sad political and Constitutional history. In its preamble, the Congolese
Constitution clearly denounces the coups d’état which used to be the only means
of seizing power, and have inhibited the ability to have any democratic political life:
the preamble calls upon all citizens to resort to civil disobedience in order to resist
any attempts at seizing power by force, or attempts to exercise dictatorial rule. 
Moreover, beyond these principles enlightened by the preambles, a number of
provisions appear in the corpus of the Constitution. For instance, the Beninese
Constitution dedicates one article (within the chapter dedicated to executive
power) which calls upon any Beninese to disobey orders and organise resistance
in the case of a coup d’état or seizure of power by mercenaries (article 66); this
also allows external police or armed forces (article 67) to be called upon,
especially within the framework of military cooperation or of defence agreements.
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The Burkina Faso Constitution also mentions that civil disobedience against any
power is not constitutionally legitimate (article 167); whilst the Malian Constitution
approves of disobedience in order to preserve a republican form of state. In
Congo, the citizens are acknowledged to have the right not to execute an order
which is seen to be against civil rights and liberties. 
Some Constitutions (article 65 of the Beninese Constitution) consider any attempt
against constitutional order as a ‘high treason crime’ (crime de haute trahison) or,
as a ‘crime against the nation’ (article 166 of the Burkina Faso Constitution). To
some countries, this kind of crime is not subject to prescription, as stated by the
Malian Constitution (article 121-3), the Togolese Constitution (articles 148 and
149-4) and the Congolese Constitution (article 49). 
Some Constitutions insist on the importance of civilian control. The Congolese
Constitution indicates that the public force, made up of the gendarmerie, the
police, and the military, is subordinated to civilian power (article 162-2). According
to the Togolese Constitution, the armed forces are ‘entirely subject to
constitutionally established political authorities’ (article 147). In Chad, security and
armed forces are called upon to serve the nation (article 190-2) and are said to be
subject to republican authorities and subordinated to civilian power. Beyond this,
the Chadian Constitution explores in more detail the obligations of the police, the
gendarmerie, the national and the nomadic guard to act respectfully in accordance
with human rights freedoms (articles 197, 199, 201). However, the armed forces
have not made the same obligations even if Chad (article 191-1) (as well as the
Congo (article 162) and Togo (article 147)), do proclaim that the military have to
be apolitical. The Constitution of Madagascar similarly calls for ‘the political
neutrality of the armed forces’. 
In most of the Francophone African countries, the military are not prevented from
aspiring to have an elective mandate, apart from Benin where the military who are
currently in active service have to resign from their duties prior to making a
presidential or legislative candidacy (according to articles 64 and 81), Djibouti –
where the military who are active are not allowed to present themselves as a
candidate to parliamentary elections (according to article 47-6) and Togo (which
has the same provisions as Djibouti, following article 52).  
It is important however to stress the fact that such constitutional principles have
proved to be particularly inefficient: the current resurgence of military coups and
praetorianism in Francophone Africa urges us to raise this key question: ‘What is
the value of Constitutional laws when faced with ‘bayonets’? 
3.2.4 Conscription and military service
It is hard to find provisions that deal with the French traditional model of
conscription in the Constitutions of Francophone African states. A number of these
Constitutions deal with ‘the defence of the country and the territorial integrity as a
duty for all the citizens’, as stated by the Beninese (article 32), the Chadian
(article 51), the Nigerian and the Togolese (article 43) Constitutions: in these
countries it is said that military service is obligatory. Other countries only ask their
citizens to contribute towards the defence of the nation, as stressed by the
Burkinabe (article 10-1), the Centrafrican (article 16), the Gabonese (article 1-21)
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
22
and the Malian (article 22) Constitutions. In Mali, only nationals who are recruited
to serve in public service are obliged to do compulsory military service.
3.2.5 The model of a developmental army
Traditionally, most Francophone countries have a role envisioned for their armies
in both economic development and in education. 
In a number of countries, the Constitution states that the armed forces may
participate in the economic, social and cultural development of the country. Some
Constitutions plead for enlarging the missions of the armed forces by involving
them in the social and economic development of the nation, as stated by the
Congolese (article 168), the Gabonese (article 1-22) and the Chadian (article 194)
Constitutions. The Congo even considers that their armed forces can take part in
the cultural development of the nation, while Chad assigns humanitarian missions
to them.
Even if these missions are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitutions
themselves, missions that more generally involve the military in development or
humanitarian projects are often considered as a possible role for the armed
forces. Because of its resources, the military is often seen as the only
organisation most able to perform a wide range of developmental tasks in more
remote areas. The use of the armed forces is seen as a way of creating a
combination of interests between the population and the military. 
For a lot of the time, the Engineering corps in every Francophone country is
involved in development/humanitarian missions as well as the Health Service. The
armies of Mali and Benin have been particularly active in this area (training the
public in basic hygiene and sanitation; implementing inoculation and vaccination
campaigns; building or repair of schools and/or roads; as well as providing air
transport facilities to remote areas). 
3.2.6 Administrative and territorial organisation in the former French African
colonies
With regards to the security apparatus, the administrative and territorial
organisation of a state does matter. Indeed, some security institutions (for
instance the municipal police, where they actually exist, or the military regions that
are generally based at the territorial division of a country) are supposed to work
closely with decentralised entities (e.g. mayors). A growing number of SSR
programmes envision the making of decentralised authorities which will be given
more responsibilities within a security area. 
Most Francophone states have inherited the French system of a highly centralised
state. Before the wave of decentralisation in the 1990s, the territorial division of
Francophone countries was composed of departments, districts (arrondissements),
administrative posts and communes which were originally merely administrative
bodies. These structures were therefore only devolved, since they were
administered by representatives appointed by the state. Nowadays, most of the
Francophone states formally recognise both administrative zones and local
authorities. Inspired by the French decentralisation process (launched in the
14 Some countries, such as Guinea, have neither departments nor regions; or they only exist in theory as
in the CAR. 
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1980s), most of the African Constitutions now recognise the right of local
authorities to administer themselves freely. Territorial administration is contained
within the Constitution, and local authorities are created by law. Consequently, a
number of laws that deal with the decentralisation process were adopted in most
Francophone African states at the beginning of the 1990s (mostly between 1993
and 1995); these have created local authorities in the provinces and in communes.
These kinds of provisions generally result from an obligation to abide by the
programmes of structural and institutional adjustment and an urge to implement
regional development policies and administrative reforms, as well as an attempt to
bring the state closer to those it administers and to favour local democracy.
The Francophone African territories are generally divided into:
z regions or provinces;
z departments;14
z communes (including those with a particular status);
z rural communities or rural circles in some countries;
z districts (Arrondissements) in big cities;
z quarters and villages. 
According to existing laws, most of the regions, departments, and communes
have their own fields of competence and their own financial resources.
As in France, communes are meant to be administered by mayors appointed by
municipal councils and elected by direct elections. Territorial bodies are supposedly
free to run their own affairs, under the supervision of a state representative. The
state is present locally through a system of administrative authorities: prefects, sub-
prefects and, in some cases, administrative posts. In most countries, the region is
both an administrative sub-division of the state and of a local authority. 
However, in a number of countries these provisions are far from effective: in urban
and rural communes and in the provinces, communal elections, while planned by
the Constitution or by the law, have never actually been held. At each
administrative level, the authorities are appointed by the central authorities,
including when they are supposed to be elected. 
3.3 Democratic versus authoritarian regimes
As mentioned above, most of the Francophone countries formally embraced
democratic political reforms in the early 1990s. The first set of multiparty elections
was held between 1991 and 1993. However, achievements in democratisation of
the security apparatus vary from country to country. It is necessary to make a
distinction between the security apparatuses which are operating within this
institutional framework in a democratic way and those which are using it to foster
their dictatorial rule. 
15 Despite the control over the army, the Guinean army experienced regular mutinies, organised by
soldiers advocating for higher pay, better working conditions and demands for compensation from the
families of Guinean soldiers killed while on peace missions. These mutinies were severely repressed,
except the last, in April 2008, Lansana Conté having agreed to negotiate with the leaders. 
16 Since the death of General Eyadéma in 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé has become Head of the
Togolese state. Faure Gnassingbé is a civilian but is supported by the military. 
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Countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Benin can be considered as having a
security apparatus operating under democratic rule. In the two latter countries the
military played a central role in enforcing democracy. By maintaining its neutrality
through the democratic transition and during the first two presidential elections,
the Beninese military contributed to the conduct of transparent elections. In Mali,
after the coup led by Amadou Toumani Toure to overthrow the military ruler
Moussa Traore, the military remained true to its avowed goal of democratic
restoration and allowed a peaceful transfer of power to the newly elected
President Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992. From 2005 to 2008, Mauritania seemed
to be on the same kind of trajectory: the coup led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall, which ended Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya’s twenty-one years of strong-
arm rule, had been generally accepted, while the military junta had organised
elections. The leader of the junta, Col. Vall promised to relinquish power
peacefully. The first fully democratic Presidential election since 1960, held on
11 March 2007, had been initially seen as the final phase in the transfer from
military to civilian rule following the military coup in 2005. However, on 6 August
2008, the head of the Presidential Guards – General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz,
former Chief of Staff of the Mauritanian army – overthrew the democratically-
elected government. 
In contrast, in Togo, Guinea, Congo, Chad and to a lesser extent Gabon, the Central
African Republic or Cameroon, personal powers respect no constitutional limitations,
even when these exist. Many institutions of democratic control of the security sector
(for instance Ombudsmans and Mediators, Public Account, Human Rights
Commissions) have been created but do not function. From an institutional point of
view, it is possible to make a distinction between undemocratic regimes headed by
military leaders (Chad, the Central African Republic, Guinea,15 Congo-Brazzaville,
Burkina Faso) and undemocratic regimes operating under civilian rule (Gabon,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo):16 however, this institutional difference does not have
any particular implication as regards the security apparatus. In the two sets of
countries, the security sector is mainly characterised by bad governance. 
3.4 Institutional organisation of the security apparatus
In France, the fundamental principles of the national defence and security
organisation refer to the domain of legislation. In most of the Francophone African
countries, the organisation of the security apparatus is also fixed by laws. 
3.4.1 National security organisations
Most Francophone states do not have National Security Councils. In a number of
countries it is the Constitution that sets up High Councils on National Defence.
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Besides the Constitutional provisions, it is hard to find information relating to these
organisations because most of the time, these structures are just hollow and
empty shells, as in Cameroon and CAR. 
In Guinea, a Supreme Council on National Defence, presided over by the
President, was set up, but it is hard to find information about its membership,
functions and objectives. 
In Mali, there are two main bodies that are in charge of the general security sector
and these are under the direct authority of the President of the Republic:
z The Higher Council on National Defence: located in the Council of Ministers, it
is the decision-making and advisory body on issues related to general
defence. This Council is made up of representatives from military personnel
and representatives from the military command structure. It is chaired by the
President of the Republic and includes the prime minister as well as the
Ministers of Defence, local Government and Decentralisation and Ministers of
Finance and Foreign affairs. A similar organisation can be found in Burkina as
well;
z The National Defence Committee which is chaired by the President of the
Republic. It includes the prime minister, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of
Staff for national defence, the armed forces Inspector General and the Chiefs
of Staff of the Defence services.
The administrative function of these two bodies is carried out by the General
Secretary for National Defence (part of the Prime Minister’s Office, which is similar
to the SGDN – Secrétariat général de la Défense Nationale – in France).
Moreover, the Council of Ministers, under the authority of the prime minister, is a
second level of coordination. Finally, in theory, a single ministry can contribute to
the coordination of the security apparatus when it is in charge of the activities
carried out by several services. For instance, in Mali, the Minister of Internal
Security is in charge of the police, the gendarmerie and the National Guard.
In some countries, such as Burkina Faso, a coordinating unit for internal security
forces was implemented in 2001. This unit, under the direct responsibility of the
Minister in charge of Security, includes the permanent secretary of the Ministry of
Security, the Chief of Staff of the National gendarmerie, the Chief of Staff of the
national police force and the Chief of Staff of the national fire brigade. It is in
charge of coordinating, designing and monitoring national security policy and is
responsible for organising and coordinating the activities of law enforcement
forces, both in their administrative and investigative missions. The unit also
oversees the activities of the armed forces when they are asked to protect
institutions, persons or goods. It also programmes the procurement of materials
and equipment used by security forces. In Burkina Faso, there is also a Ministerial
Committee on Defence Intelligence which is chaired by the prime minister.
3.4.2 The Minister of Defence 
The defence policy is implemented by the Ministry of Defence. The Minister of
Defence/Armed forces is generally in charge of the implementation of military
defence policy under the authority of the President. He is responsible for
17 Some regional prefects, directors of state companies, and directors of customs services are also
appointed from the military.
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organising the armed forces and responsible for ensuring that they are operational
by providing them with the resources, equipment and infrastructures that they
require. He also has the responsibility for military cooperation with foreign
countries. 
However, in a number of countries, the Presidents of the Republic violate the
provisions of the Constitutions and cumulate their function with the function of the
Ministry of Defence. In Cameroon, Paul Biya is de facto the Minister of Defence:
there is only a Deputy Minister of Defence and a National Security Delegate for
internal security there. In Guinea, President Lansana Conté has retained the
portfolio of the Ministry of Defence for several years. In the Central African
Republic, the President also holds the portfolio of the Ministry of Defence.
Furthermore, in a number of countries (e.g. Togo), Ministers of Defence – as well
as Ministers of the Interior – have been appointed from the military.17
3.4.3 The armed forces in the former French colonies
During the post-independence period, the national armed forces were the central
institution of the security system in a number of Francophone states: they were
thought of as the cornerstone of the security system. Rather than coping with
external threats (often thanks to the protection guaranteed by the defence
agreements with France) the national armed forces turned out to be a political
instrument of the regime in power and mainly fought the political opposition.
It is often far from easy to assess the number of people who are directly employed
in the defence sector in Francophone Africa accurately. 
3.4.3.1 The Chief of Staff
The Minister of Defence is assisted by the Chief of Staff, who also generally
serves as the military advisor to the government. The Chief of Staff ensures the
general command of the armed forces, with the assistance of various force
commanders and the directors of joint force units (in some countries such as
Benin, a Military High Command coordinate them). The General Staff is placed
under the direct authority of the Minister of Defence and serves as the central
command and coordination unit of the armed forces. 
In some countries such as Niger, the single structure of the armed forces – with a
unique military chain of command placed under the authority of the Minister of
Defence and under the responsibility of the Chief of Staff – has been abandoned.
From now on, two separate branches – the army and the air force – have been
set up and each is placed under the command of its own Chief of Staff. 
18 The gendarmerie which is a military force that has been empowered to undertake police missions, and
which has no counterpart in Anglophone Africa, will be dealt with in the section dedicated to police forces.
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3.4.3.2 The armed forces’ services
In the sections below, there will be a focus on the defining characteristics of the
Francophone armed forces.18 It is important to note that all the developments
relating to the corruption of the armed forces (as well as the police forces) in
Anglophone Africa (cf. below) are also valid with regards to Francophone Africa.
3.4.3.2.1 The militarisation of internal order
In democratic Francophone African states, the armed forces are only involved in
external defence missions (protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the state), except in cases of exceptional circumstances (e.g. a state of
emergency or natural disasters). They can also sometimes be involved in so-
called ‘development missions’. In an autocratic country such as Cameroon, the
armed forces are also limited to carrying out defence missions (except when they
are fighting against the so-called ‘coupeurs de route’). 
On the other hand, states such as Togo, Guinea and Chad base dictatorial rule
upon their armed forces. The armed forces are released from their conventional
duties e.g. territorial defence and serve as a tool of territorial and political control
of the population. This tendency has resulted in the militarisation of policing. 
The public’s confidence in the security forces has been eroded by the repeated
intervention of the military in domestic assignments of law enforcement. In Guinea
for instance, army tanks were intermittently deployed in the streets during peace
time, whilst in the Congo, the presidential guard was the first outfit to be deployed
in the event of internal security problems.
3.4.3.2.2 Ethnic forces
The ethnicisation of Africa’s military forces is an enduring feature of a number of
Francophone African militia. Contrary to Anglophone Africa, this ethnicisation
process cannot be analysed as the result of the Africanisation process of the
armed forces. Indeed, as suggested in the introduction, French military advisors
and coopérants have been very influential within the Francophone military since
independence: the ethnicisation processes in a number of countries have been
led without the complete withdrawal of the former colonial power. 
The armed forces are highly ethnicised in Togo, Guinea and Chad, being largely
dominated by the ethnic group of the President (The Kabye in Togo, the Mandé,
the Soussou in Guinea and the Zaghawas in Chad). In CAR, even if President
Bozizé is not currently leading any ethnicised policies, the policies of his
predecessors (especially those of President Kolingba and of Patassé) have
resulted in an ethnicised military, dominated by the Yakoma and, to a lesser
extent, the Sara ethnic group. 
19 The Bataillon autonome de sécurité présidentielle is a central part of the Guinean security apparatus. 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
28
3.4.3.2.3 Professionalism and operational effectiveness
All Francophone African armed forces are made up of a combination of an army,
an air force and a gendarmerie. However, the armed forces are under-resourced
in terms of staff and equipment. The existence of defence agreements with
France and the presence of French forces stationed in some countries (Senegal,
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Chad and CAR until 1997) on a permanent basis,
often deter Francophone African rulers from developing the readiness of their
forces. The policy led by Félix-Houphouët Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire, until his death
in 1993, is a good example of such a phenomenon. 
Senegal can be seen as the only Francophone country with a professionalised,
republican and well-trained army. The lack of professionalism can often be
explained by the lack of transparent and merit-based policies. The criteria for
recruitment and promotion within the armed forces is characterised by a high
degree of opaqueness. This situation has created a climate of suspicion and
frustration, which is not very favourable to the esprit de corps. Privileges and
promotion are more often than not allocated on a subjective basis, and even in
countries where there is no exclusive ethnic-based policy, ethnic affiliations and
regional ties do matter more than professionalism. 
Coastal countries, such as Senegal and Cameroon, have navies, but they are ill-
equipped and seldom operational. In a lot of Francophone countries, the air force is
more implicit than effective. In most cases, there are simply no aircraft, and the air
force’s personnel are employed in other services. In fact, the navy and the air force
can be seen as token forces. Chad and Côte d’Ivoire are noticeable exceptions.
This lack of effectiveness of the armed forces may seem paradoxical considering
that we have underlined the process of militarisation of internal order. In fact, only
some of the armed forces units have been involved in internal law enforcement
missions; for instance, the Presidential Guards. 
3.4.3.2.4 The Republican/Presidential Guards
Officially, the mission of the presidential guard is to protect the Head of State
when he travels abroad or within the country, and the presidential residences. The
Presidential Guards are usually drawn from the rank of the military (officers and
non-commissioned officers) and the gendarmerie. However, the Presidential
Guards – called the Republican Guard in some Francophone African countries
which makes reference to the French Republican Guard – are often configured as
praetorian bodies: in Guinea they are, incidentally, called the ‘Praetorian Guard’.
These forces are usually appointed on the basis of their loyalty towards the
President and recruited according to ethnic criteria. In a lot of Francophone
countries, the Presidential Guard is the core security body in non-democratic
countries such as the Central African Republic, Guinea19 and Mauritania (prior to
and after the 2005 coup). These units are accountable to virtually no one except
the President. Even if they are formally integrated into the armed forces’ chain of
command, these Presidential Guards are not accountable to the Chief of Staff or
to the Ministry of Defence. 
20 In Chad the National Guard is called the Nomadic Guard. 
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Presidential Guards can be found in less authoritarian states: for instance, there is
also a Presidential Guard in Cameroon, but its influence bears no comparison to
those of the three countries mentioned above. Even if their missions are less
outrageous, they enjoy special status. In Burkina Faso, the Presidential Guard is
an autonomous security force, although it is technically subject to the jurisdiction
of the armed forces and part of the army. In Niger, the former Republican Guard
(the oldest existing corps of Niger’s armed forces) were merged in 1997 with the
members of the former rebel movements, and incorporated into the force following
the peace agreements signed between 1995 and 1998. The new force is called
the FNIS (National Intervention and Security Force), and is an autonomous corps,
which comes under the responsibility of the Minister of Interior. The FNIS is
responsible for maintaining order in some areas (mostly rural areas and the
protection of public buildings in urban centres). They can also provide protection
to the high official travelling in the rural part of the country. 
In a number of countries (e.g. CAR, Niger), the Presidential Guards are also
responsible for providing guard services in prison. 
The Presidential Guards are one of the major symptoms of the system of
competing security agencies and parallel chains of command which characterise
the military in Francophone Africa. The Presidential/Republican Guards are
generally better equipped than the other armed forces and they also enjoy virtual
immunity for the crimes and abuses that they commit.
3.4.3.2.5 The National Guards (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad)20
In Mali and Mauritania, the National Guard carries out important duties both military
and civilian in essence. It contributes to maintaining order and public safety as well
as to the general policing of territorial communities. It is entrusted with providing
security to political and administrative institutions. It is also involved in the prison
services. What is distinct about the National Guard is that it has the ability to grow
into a formidable fighting force, capable of serving alongside the army. In Mauritania,
the National Guard has served as a balance to the army. It was credited with saving
Ould Taya’s regime in 2003 during the coup attempt led by elements of the army. 
The National Guard is managed by the Minister of Defence but in operations is
put under the authority of the Minister of the Interior (sometimes called Minister in
charge of (Internal) Security). 
Generally, a Chief of Staff heads, coordinates and controls the activities and
duties of the division commanders and the heads of units (who command the
territorial units in the provinces). 
The National Guard is present all over the national territory and works essentially
for the benefit of the administration and the population. It is a highly decentralised
force. The territorial organisation of the National Guard is duplicating the
administration division of the country. National Guards are particularly worth
considering because they have been recently reformed during the 1990s in order
to integrate members of former rebels’ movements from the Sahelian region.
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3.4.3.3 Military justice
There is still no military code of justice within some African Francophone
countries. Elsewhere, the ordinances which govern the statute of the military in
Francophone countries in Africa can hardly be found. In Congo-Brazzaville, the
military court is made up of magistrates who are appointed by decree. In Niger, for
instance, soldiers that commit crimes and offences are tried by civilian courts.
However, in 2002 a tribunal was set up by the government that was in charge of
dealing with mutinies. This regulation was based on the legislation of countries
that had the same legal traditions (Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire). 
3.4.3.4 Legacy from the socialist regimes
It is worth mentioning that, post-independence, a number of Constitutions were
inspired by Marxism-Leninism – or Chinese communism – in Mali, Benin, Guinea,
Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic and Chad. Consequently, the
security apparatus of these countries has some legacy from the cooperation with
the Soviet Union (especially with regards to equipment and a culture of secrecy). 
Under military leadership, Benin and Congo were formally known as the ‘People’s
Republic’, and adhered to Marxism-Leninism until the fall of communism in 1989. 
In these states (NDI 1997) with socialist leanings, the army was often fully politicised.
The situation in Guinea, the only Francophone state to have chosen independence in
1958 when France tried to reconfigure its colonial empire, is a good example.
Guinea, which was under one-party military rule, adopted socialist policies and
developed close political ties to Eastern Bloc countries and the People’s Republic of
China. Marxist ideology determined the structure and organisation of the military and
heightened the role of the armed forces in society, thereby determining their relations
with other sociopolitical organisations. Sékou Touré opted for a socialist approach to
civil-military relations, which included the concept of ‘militants in uniforms’ as the
cornerstone of Guinea’s military status. The military was thus to be the armed branch
of the single party, and replicated the party’s organisational structure. For example, a
military committee was set up in every political structure which competed with the
regular military chain of command. An officer was specifically politically indoctrinated
within each unit. The armed forces, as well as the civilian militarised units, were given
the duty of defending the Guinean Revolution. The military was organised as an army
of citizen soldiers that were fully integrated into society. This tradition continues to this
day. In the Congo-Brazzaville, during the socialist era, the military, the gendarmerie
and the police had combined command structures. This kind of tradition has often
resulted in confusion amongst the civilian population who have difficulty in
distinguishing the army from the police or the gendarmerie. 
3.4.4 Police forces in Francophone Africa
One of the defining features of Francophone states relies in large part on the kind
of security forces which are responsible for the maintenance of internal order. In
most Francophone African countries, that used to be under French colonial rule,
the policing system is modelled on the French system, and is centrally controlled.
The police system in these countries is, therefore, French in its organisational
structure, equipment and nomenclature. 
21 Internal order relates to the protection of public order against disruption, to the protection of institutions
against insurrection, and to the enforcement of judiciary and administrative decisions. 
22 In Francophone countries, the term ‘police judiciaire’ relates to the police services responsible for
criminal investigations and prosecutions. In English, there is no relevant term to faithfully translate
police judiciaire. The difficulties in translating the term cannot be seen as purely linguistic. On the
contrary, they are a symptom of the conceptual differences existing between Francophone and
Anglophone security systems, particularly as regards the policing system. Interestingly, it is also
difficult to find a satisfying translation for the term ‘gendarmerie’. That is why the author has chosen to
use the French terms throughout this text. 
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Two different services are nationally involved in the protection of internal order:21
z the police forces;
z the gendarmerie forces. 
In addition, in some countries municipal police forces operate alongside these two
forces and are under the mayor’s supervision. 
The paragraphs below focus on the way in which policing functions in
Francophone Africa; however, it is important to note that the militarisation of the
internal order mentioned above (paragraph 3.4.3.2.1) has resulted in a weakening
of the police forces in most of the Francophone countries. More frequently, police
forces are under-staffed and under-equipped and are therefore unable to cope
with public insecurity. Under-paid, the police forces are often the most corrupt
security bodies and the population consequently see them as a danger.  
3.4.4.1 Organisational, territorial and functional divisions between police forces
To understand the way in which policing functions in Francophone African
countries, it is necessary to make a threefold distinction:
z First, there is an organic division between the police forces and the
gendarmerie forces. The gendarmerie is a paramilitary organisation, whilst the
National Police are a civilian force. The National Police comes within the
jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior (Security/Internal security/and
Decentralisation). The National Gendarmerie is part of the military forces, and
comes under the jurisdiction of a General Directorate of the Ministry of
Defence. However, in operational matters, the gendarmerie has to respond to
the agency that requires and asks for its services;
z Second, there is a territorial division. Police units usually carry out their duties
in urban areas and cities, whereas the gendarmerie intervenes in rural areas,
and at borders (sometimes along with forest security and customs units);
z Third, there is a legal/functional division between the functions of the
administrative police and the ‘police judiciaire’22 (although this distinction is not
always apparent, since police personnel can fulfil both functions). 
3.4.4.1.1 Administrative police and police judiciaire missions
In addition to the rural/urban and paramilitary/civilian divisions between the
gendarmeries and the police forces, there is a legal and functional division within
23 In some countries, such as Senegal, the prefects have lost their police judiciaire officer’s status since
the reform of judiciary procedure in 1985. 
24 Within their investigative responsibilities, the police judiciaire works under the supervision of the
judiciary power: ‘while they may opportunely collect evidence to establish that a crime has been
committed, they must present said evidence to the court and, once legal proceedings commence, they
are subject to the direction of the examining magistrate (juge d’instruction) and the prosecutor’ (in Das
and Palmiotto 2006).
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each of the two police forces, between the administrative and the investigative
police (the police judiciaire). These two functions are exercised both by the
national police and the gendarmerie. Therefore, members of the two police
organisations have the status of both administrative police and police judiciaire:
z The administrative police are characterised as being, essentially, for
preventive purposes, responsible for the protection of persons and property,
and for law enforcement. Both the National Police and the National
Gendarmerie are in charge of responsibilities such as maintaining order,
controlling and preventing crime, enforcing public peace, looking after public
health, and regulating traffic; 
z The police judiciaire is responsible for the detection of crime, investigation of
crime and the arrest of suspects. In some countries, in addition to the two
police forces, some administrative authorities, such as the prefects, can also
be considered as police judiciaire officers.23 The police judiciaire agents of the
two police forces mentioned are specifically trained to be responsible for
discovering crimes, for gathering evidence and to seek out offenders. In both
organisations the police judiciaire are answerable to the Minister of Justice.
When they act as police judiciaire, the police and the gendarmerie forces
come under the authority of the courts, particularly the juge d’instruction
(examining magistrate) and the procureur (prosecutor).24 The police can be
officers of the courts along with the examining magistrates and prosecutors.
Under the instructions by an examining magistrate, officers of the police
judiciaire have the power to detain suspects for questioning for 48 hours or, if
approved by a public prosecutor, up to 96 hours, in order to investigate an
offence, to prepare the proceedings of the inquiry and to receive complaints
and the charges and declarations of those who have an interest in the case. 
The preventive/administrative police and the police judiciaire are closely tied and
complementary to one another. When the administrative police fail in their mission
of prevention, the police judiciaire are then activated. Yet both of these activities
are carried out by the same personnel. 
3.4.4.2 The national police forces
As with the gendarmerie, the national police force is in charge of gathering and
processing intelligence, and of ensuring internal security and public order.
Policemen are the first class of force who can maintain public order. The
gendarmerie becomes involved as the second category force. Under exceptional
circumstances (e.g. in a state of emergency), the armed forces may be called in
as a third category force to back up the police and gendarmerie forces with law
enforcement missions. 
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3.4.4.2.1 Organisation
Most of the time, the General Directorate of the National Police (Direction générale
de la police nationale – DGPN) comes under the responsibility of the Minister in
charge of security (for instance Mali, Benin), or under the responsibility of the
Minister of the Interior (Niger).25 In a large number of Francophone African countries,
the control of the National Police Force is still seen as a political matter with the
Chief of Police, and his lieutenants, as nominees of the President of the Republic.
The Director General of police coordinates the activities of all the police
departments. The General Directorate of the National Police manages both
internal and external matters of the organisation and is assisted in this task by:
z The General Inspection of Police Services (Inspection générale des services
de Police), which is a technical division that helps the General Director to carry
out his role that relates to the general control of police personnel (with respect
to the deontological rules, statutes and budget management). This service
leads inspections and controls and evaluates the functioning of administrative,
technical and operational services, as well as leading administrative and
disciplinary inquests of police agencies and personnel;
z The General Secretariat of the Police Services (Secretariat général des
services de Police), which is the technical division that helps the General
Director to manage human resources, financial services and equipment. This
service develops and maintains the police’s real estate, centralises personnel
needs, manages the police archives, manages schools, promotes social,
sanitary and cultural operations within the police service, and pre-processes
payroll operations and the liquidation of pension rights. 
The Directorate General of the National Police is often divided into the following
departments:
z The Department of Public Security, in charge of maintaining public order and
controlling common offences (assaults, rape, theft, fraud, mugging…); it is
often the largest component of the police force. Regional departments of
public security are generally allocated to each administrative region, whereas
police stations are located within cities; 
z The Criminal Investigation Department (police judiciaire), which is the
department that investigates and prosecutes major and organised crime. The
criminal investigation department carries out investigative missions and assists
with judiciary power: it is the department that is in charge of investigations and
prosecutions ordered by the public prosecutor, or by the court, in cases of
offences26 of common law. 
z The territorial surveillance department, which issues permission to enter or exit
the national territory (counterpart of the so-called police aux frontières in France). 
25 In some countries, such as Burkina Faso, police services are headed by a Director of Security
Services, with at least the rank of Chief Commissioner.
26 In Burkina Faso, the criminal investigation department is made up of members of the gendarmerie, the
police force, and public administration, which is appointed by the government to this department.
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z The intelligence department is responsible for administrative inquiries and
individual surveillance. In some countries (Côte d’Ivoire for instance),
intelligence staff are allowed to carry hand-weapons.27
Each department is organised into several more general departments, regional
departments, provincial departments, country desks and services. In the various
regions, departments are placed under the administrative authority of the regional
governor, and under the technical authority of the director general. This dual layer
of hierarchical and technical authority enables regional governors to carry out their
roles as both regional public services, and chiefs of security in their area of
expertise.
In some countries (e.g. Benin), the police forces also encompass several rapid,
specialised intervention groups, such as the crime squad, and the Compagnies
Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), inspired by the French counterparts, which are
used to handle local emergencies and rescue operations. In emergencies, police
prefects can call upon the Minister to request the use of any CRSs in his
jurisdiction.
3.4.4.2.2 Grades and functions
The National Police are organised into four corps; there are a number of levels
within each (Kurian 2006): 
z Sergeants and constables. Within this group, the levels are: probationary
constables, second-class and first-class constables, sergeants and staff-
sergeants in the sergeants and constable corps; 
z Peace officers. There are three levels of staff officers;
z Police inspectors. There are five levels of police inspectors;
z Police commissioners. There are six levels of commissioners (probationary
commissioner, second and first class commissioner, principal commissioner,
divisional commissioner and controller general of the police). 
Furthermore, there are two levels within the police judiciaire services: higher
ranking officers of the Gendarmerie are commissioners, and officers of the
National Police; lower ranking personnel are agents of the police judiciaire. It is
they who gather information and intelligence, as required, and report their findings
to their superiors.
In theory, recruits are selected by competition for direct entry into one of the four
corps. To pass from one corps to another, a candidate has to pass a professional
examination to make the necessary educational upgrade and to be promoted.
They must hold citizenship of the country, and not be deemed to be ineligible by
certain terms of the penal law, have completed their military service, and to have
passed a background check. They then enter a police academy to receive the
appropriate training for their corps. However, these provisions are often ignored,
27 In some countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, there is also a commercial police department that is
responsible for preventing and sanctioning economic offences.
35
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
and a number of policemen (if not the majority of them in some countries) are
recruited according to biased and often nepotistic criteria. 
3.4.4.3 The municipal police
In some Francophone countries such as Burkina Faso and CAR, municipal police
forces operate, along with national police forces based in towns. However, in a lot
of countries, municipal police forces only exist in theory (Mali, Benin). 
The municipal police are generally controlled by the Ministry of Territorial
Administration. Supervising municipal police services is one of the responsibilities
of the municipalities. Therefore, the municipal police come under the authority of a
mayor and operate under a municipal police commandant. Its main functions are
to assist mayors with applying police regulations, supporting other municipal
services and providing ceremonial services. The municipal police are generally
unarmed and have no investigative/criminal authority (Faupin 2005). 
Coming under the Home Office and directly ruled by the authority of the mayor,
the municipal police are charged with ensuring safety, security and public health.
The municipal police are a police of proximity. Their attributions are to: 
z ensure the safety and the convenience of public activities on streets, public
highways and other public facilities – notably the cleaning, the lighting, the
removal of congestion, the demolition or the repair of unsafe/contaminated
buildings;
z repress infringements on public tranquility (fights, crowds, noise and night-
gatherings);
z maintain order during large gatherings;
z inspect the accuracy of measures of foodstuff sold by weight or by measure
and the healthiness of the edible food on sale;
z ensure the protection of persons and of public and private goods;
z guarantee the preservation of public places like waterways, forests, and
hunting and fishing services. 
The municipal policemen have an obligation to report all occurrences falling under
the jurisdiction of the National Police which would have been missed and to give
assistance in any place to repress breaches of the peace, and to maintain the
morality and orderliness of the city. They submit reports in the following domains:
hunting and fishing, traffic of drink, drugs and tobacco and opportunistic
smuggling, food hygiene, public drunkenness, and coordination of local public
transport, telecommunications and electricity supply.
3.4.4.4 The gendarmerie
The gendarmerie has no equivalent in Anglophone Africa. The gendarmerie is a
specialised militarised force that is responsible for maintaining internal security
and reinforcing the duties of the national police (Revue Frères d’arme 2009). 
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The gendarmerie can be defined as a civilian police force with military status.
Because of this military status, and with its status as an armed force, the
gendarmerie falls under the control of the Defence Ministry in all Francophone
countries. But the gendarmeries often have a double affiliation with the Ministry of
Defence and the Ministry of the Interior: whilst the gendarmerie formally remains
part of the armed forces, and the Ministry of Defence is in charge of its
administration, the operational supervision lies with the Ministry of the Interior. The
Ministry of Defence is responsible for budget, recruitment, education, training,
equipment, administration and logistics of the gendarmerie forces. The gendarmerie
can contribute to the defence of the country, when requested. However, the
gendarmes are mainly responsible – in times of peace – for the protection of
persons and property, the surveillance of territory and the maintenance of public
order and law enforcement. In these times of peace, the gendarmerie is in charge of
gathering intelligence in addition to providing internal security. That is why the
gendarmerie are able to carry out their missions on behalf of other ministries,
particularly the Ministry of Justice and/or the Ministry of Internal Security/the Interior.
The gendarmerie is also in charge of the security of communication routes. 
3.4.4.4.1 Organisation
The gendarmerie is organised militarily: its organisation is directly derived from the
French model. In most Francophone African countries, the General Director of the
National Gendarmerie (Directeur général de la gendarmerie nationale – DGGN) is
directly responsible to the Minister of the Armed Forces and holds the same rank
and advantages as the general Chief of Staff. In Senegal, the General Director is
called the Gendarmerie High Commander. In Cameroon, gendarmerie forces are
under the command of a Delegate Secretary of State, independent from the
(Deputy) Minister of Defence. 
In most Francophone African countries, the DGGN is for the most part a general
officer, responsible for implementing the plans and directives that are decided by
the Minister. It is important to mention that the DGGN is also in some cases the
Director of the Military Justice. 
Under the responsibility of the DGGN, the gendarmerie general staff is headed up
by a general officer, appointed by decree, who is responsible for the organisation,
coordination and control of the gendarmerie divisions. Most of the time, the
general staff is divided between the following divisions:
z The Operations Division is in charge of the preparation of projects and
directives that relate to the engagement and operations of the units (military
operations, manoeuvres);
z The Information Division, intelligence service, is responsible for the collection,
synthesis and dissemination of the information that is gathered on the ground
by the units; 
z The Staff Division is in charge of human resources management (recruitment,
promotions, pensions, firing);
z The Military Justice Division is in charge of investigating the violations committed
by the officers and soldiers, through its military police mission (prévôté). This
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division studies the cases, prepares the cases prior to sending them before the
tribunals, and follows the legislation that deals with military justice; 
z The Training Division is responsible for the training curricula. It designs
pedagogic support resources;
z The Plan and Research Division; 
z The Communication Division, responsible for public relations (internal and
external) of the Gendarmerie.
The gendarmerie is made up of two sub-divisions, the so-called ‘Major
Commands’ (Grands commandements): the territorial gendarmerie (gendarmerie
territoriale) and the mobile gendarmerie (gendarmerie mobile). Each of these
commands has its own general staff and administrative/financial services:
z The territorial gendarmerie is the cornerstone of the gendarmerie. The
territorial gendarmerie is responsible for national territory surveillance,
gathering intelligence, and the execution of investigative (police judiciaire),
military and administrative police missions. To execute its missions, the
command of the territorial gendarmerie is divided into:
z the legions. Each of these is made up of a number of companies, which
are divided into several territorial brigades and one mobile squadron;
z a database, that is supposed to be closely connected to services that are
in charge of national security (the intelligence services of the police forces
– often called the RG and the DST as described below); 
z a military police brigade, placed under the orders of the General Chief of
the armed forces. 
z The mobile gendarmerie is the second Great Command of the gendarmerie.
The mobile gendarmerie is specifically responsible for law enforcement all
over the national territory and for the protection of the authorities. It has
absolutely no police judiciaire missions and its members are therefore not
police judiciaire officers. It is often made up of two legions and the GIGN:
z The security Legion (légion de sécurité) is made up of three squadron
groups that are located in the capital. These squadrons are in charge of
the protection of public buildings (Presidential Residences, the National
Assembly, Ministries, Courts of Justice) and with escorting official
personalities; 
z The intervention legion (légion de gendarmerie d’intervention) is made up
of two squadron groups and one command squadron. They are
specifically responsible for law enforcement and restoration and they have
the capability of protecting national territory. It also participates in war
operations alongside units of the army. 
z The GIGN (Groupement d’intervention de la gendarmerie nationale). 
28 In some countries faced with an increasing criminality, the police functions of the gendarmerie,
especially within the police judiciaire branch, have been increasingly reinforced. In Senegal, for
instance, brigades specialising in criminal investigations have been created in each legion, and a new
police judiciaire pole (pole de police judiciaire) has been created, with a new central database, and a
new research section with investigators endowed with national authority. This research section is
organised in different cells, which deal with all forms of delinquency (e.g. hold ups, money laundering,
drug trafficking and drug consumption, youth delinquency). This empowerment of the gendarmerie
occurred in association with the national police, and with the assistance of the French.
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3.4.4.4.2 Missions 
The missions and resources of the gendarmerie are generally fixed by a decree.
The gendarmerie is essentially meant to ensure direct action by the
administrative, judiciary and military police. The gendarmerie is also entitled to
fulfil national defence missions, to assist the judiciary, administrative and military
authorities, as well as assist all other ministerial departments. It therefore roughly
fulfils four kinds of missions:
z police missions;
z national defence missions;
z public service missions;
z and, increasingly, a contribution to peacekeeping operations.
Police missions
With regards to its police missions, the gendarmerie is a force that is entitled to:
z protect public safety;
z ensure law enforcement and the execution of the laws and regulations;
z guarantee permanent and preventive surveillance. 
The gendarmerie carries out the function of criminal investigators in rural areas,
under the authority of the relevant judiciary authority. In rural areas, the
gendarmerie carries out the missions of the national police forces, for instance
ensuring the safety of persons and goods, maintaining public order, as well as
enforcing respect of laws and regulations. In rural areas, the gendarmes are
mainly concerned with controlling crime, particularly illegal immigration,
contraband trade across frontiers and black marketing. Most police services are
delivered at brigade level. In most of the countries, the gendarmerie has regional
headquarters in each region of that country, as well as brigades in the rural
districts. Three types of policing missions need to be distinguished:
z The administrative police whose main purpose is to maintain order in a
preventive way and which covers a broad range of missions: the general
surveillance of persons and goods; traffic and road police; public sites police;
civil protection and relief organisations; maritime police; air navigation police;
economic police; fishing and hunting police; 
z The police judiciaire. Their mission is exercised under the direction of the
prosecutor of the Republic and under the control of the General Prosecutor. It
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assists with the recording of all crimes and offences against the law, in
gathering pieces of evidence and in searching out the perpetrators – as long
as judiciary information (information judiciaire) has been launched. The
gendarmerie executes judiciary delegations and requisitions;28
z The military police. This mission aims to prevent disorder and to maintain
discipline within military bodies, for instance by searching out defectors or
keeping a watch on soldiers on leave. It assists with recording purely military
disobedience as well as violations against civil law (droit commun) committed
by the members of the armed forces. Gendarmes are thus responsible for
controlling other military and paramilitary units, and for settling all disputes that
involve soldiers and other military units. 
National defence missions
With regards to its defence missions, the gendarmerie is generally organised
around three core principles:
z Ensuring a general and permanent control of national territory;
z Ensuring the cohesion of the military defence areas (zone militaires de défence);
z Righting the administrative organisation of the national territory. In theory,
there is one brigade in each sub-prefecture, one company in each department
and one mobile squadron in each region. 
Because it is deployed all over the national territory, the gendarmerie is a central
player in the implementation of the concept of Operational Defence of the Territory
(Défense opérationnelle du territoire – DOT): 
z The gendarmerie protects the permanent secretariat of the regional defence
committees, notably through the gathering of intelligence;
z In peacetime, the gendarmerie participates in exercises and military manoeuvres;
z In war time, the gendarmerie is called upon to fight alongside other military
forces (not withstanding its military police mission).
z the gendarmerie also contributes to the general civil defence mission by
providing intelligence information to specialised units, and by assisting any
endangered persons. 
z the gendarmerie is also a major actor in the field of civil protection. 
Public service missions
The gendarmerie guarantees the safety of the great state institutions (the
Presidency of the Republic, the National Assembly, the Courts of Justice, the
Ministers) as well as the personal security of those in high authority (i.e. by acting
as official escorts). It also provides assistance to any Minister or state
administration in verifying the implementation of rules and laws or in searching out
and disseminating intelligence information.
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29 This title refers to the analysis of Bayleys (1985) who view the persistence of the gendarmeries as
somewhat of an anachronism. 
30 In Côte d’Ivoire, the unity of the armed forces was challenged when the President of the National
Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, seized power after the death of Félix Houphouët Boigny, escorted by
the national gendarmerie, whose adherence and loyalty to the law had been crucial until then. The
gendarmerie (as well as the police) appeared to be a force loyal to Bédié while the FANCI (Ivorian
armed forces), whose general Chief of Staff had been dismissed by him appeared as unreliable. The
gendarmerie was seen as a counterweight to the armed forces and was entrusted to keep an eye on
them. While the gendarmerie forces are traditionally meant to be equipped with light weapons, the
Ivorian gendarmerie is now equipped with tanks and cannons, which were used when General Guei
attempted to usurp the elections. Since Laurent Gbagbo came to power, the Ivorian gendarmerie has
been accused of being involved in a number of exactions and massacres. A rivalry still exists between
the gendarmerie forces, seen as legalist and loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo, and the FANCI, seen
as potential conspirators against the regime.
When carrying out public service missions, the gendarmerie is placed under the
supervision of both civilian and military authorities (Ministers of the Interior and
Defence, as well as regional prefects and mayors).
International missions
The gendarmeries of Francophone African countries are increasingly taking part in
international peacekeeping missions. They are viewed as increasingly important
instruments in addressing internal security or public order tasks that arise in post-
conflict environments. Peacekeeping missions have increasingly focused on
crowd control, protecting refugees, fighting organised crime and reorganising local
police forces, the ultimate objective being not only to destroy an enemy, but to
control, or to neutralise those causing trouble. Due to their double affiliation,
gendarmerie forces can be deployed both under civilian and under military
command. Moreover, their military skills enable them to engage in fighting
missions in situations that have deteriorated from post-conflict to war.
3.4.4.4.3 Are the gendarmerie forces an ‘anachronism’?29
All former French colonies have a dual police system at the national level, with
both gendarmeries and police forces. To a number of observers the gendarmerie
forces are seen as something of an anachronism, or anomaly, since they
represent the continuation of a military presence in domestic security, and
therefore legitimise the involvement of the armed forces in internal security
matters. The existence of the gendarmerie has been accused of violating the
basic principle of the liberal-democratic state that distinguishes between the police
and the military. Due to their militarised status, the gendarmeries are sometimes
associated with tendencies of authoritarianism. As mentioned above, one of the
core problems that is common to a number of Francophone African countries is
the insufficient separation and blurred responsibilities between the police and the
military forces. Militarised police forces such as the gendarmerie are consequently
seen as making this tendency worse. Moreover, the differences that are defined
between the police and the gendarmerie lie in their jurisdiction: urban areas as the
jurisdiction of the police versus rural areas as the jurisdiction of the gendarmeries.
Yet, in a lot of Francophone countries, this distinction is no longer respected. 
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31 The Swiss gendarmerie-type force is responsible for a number of policy-led functions such as border
control, riot control, public order and law enforcement and would, although formally part of the armed
forces, be mainly answerable to the Ministry of the Interior. Similarly, a number of former communist
states in Eastern and Central Europe have begun to transform their formerly military border guards
into gendarmerie-type forces, in order to fight cross-border crime and illegal immigration. 
Nevertheless, despite such criticism, the gendarmerie is often considered as an elite
corps: that is why its recruitment may be more stringent than for other services,
especially the army. The gendarmes generally enjoy a better reputation than the
other security forces: they appear as a disciplined corps that is respectful of the
hierarchy. The gendarmerie has generally experienced fewer mutinies than other
security forces. More often than not they have not been involved in any forcible
takeovers of power. However, in some undemocratic (Côte d’Ivoire) or dictatorial
regimes (Guinea), the gendarmeries have been viewed as a central unit that
protects the regime, and has sometimes been used as a tool of coercion against
opposition movements. In other countries, they are seen as rivals to the army.30
A number of Francophone countries have suppressed their gendarmerie forces,
as with Belgium in Europe, or Burundi and the DRC in Africa. There is currently a
debate in France, where a number of voices have been pleading for the
suppression of the gendarmerie in the context of budgetary restrictions which
makes the dual police system unaffordable.31 Conversely, Switzerland decided to
create a gendarmerie-type force in early 2000. 
In contrast, it seems to a number of specialists that there is the growing
significance of the intermediary, gendarmerie-type security force. According to them
(Lutterbeck 2004), the existence of a gendarmerie actively prevents the
militarisation of the civilian police. Furthermore, the emergence of an increasing
number of transnational risks and threats that increasingly challenge the traditional
distinction between internal and external security have pleaded for the rise of
agencies that are located between levels of internal and external security. The
distinction between external security on the one hand – identified by a concern with
mainly military threats coming from the aggressive behaviour of other states (and
captured by strategic studies) and, on the other hand, internal security – identified
as criminal, or otherwise disturbing activities, within the boundaries of a state (and
captured by criminology or justice studies), have become increasingly blurred. This
implies that both crime and war have tended to meet and, consequently, the role of
the military and the police forces have increasingly coincided. In a number of
aspects, such as with formal affiliation, internal structures and armoury, the
gendarmeries occupy an intermediary position between internal and external
security forces. The gendarmerie forces are organised along military lines and are
thus more centralised and hierarchical than the civilian police forces are; for
instance, they are equipped with heavier equipment than common police forces
(armoured cars, light infantry weapons). Finally, as mentioned above, the
gendarmeries have a double affiliation with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry
of the Interior and are carrying out their police judiciaire missions under the
supervision of the Ministry of Justice. In addition to their judiciary and law-
enforcement duties, gendarmerie forces have a military defence function (military
police, gathering intelligence, protecting sensitive sites) and they perform several
more directly combat-related tasks in the event of war. 
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Due to the fact that they combine both the characteristics of police and military
forces, the gendarmeries are viewed by some observers as particularly
appropriate institutions to deal with challenges that emerge in Africa. They are
seen as a relevant force that can easily be mobilised to deal with:
z border control to counter various transnational challenges. Gendarmerie
forces are increasingly mobilised in border enforcement, sometimes along
with the armed forces. The gendarmerie has been increasingly deployed
towards border areas, and has become involved in fighting arms and drug
trafficking. As opposed to the civilian-style police forces, the reason why the
gendarmerie forces are considered more suitable to cope with these new
missions lies in the supposedly dangerous nature of the operations of the
transnational criminal organisations across the borders. The zaraguinas,
which operate in CAR, Chad and Cameroon, who are now spreading over the
borders are a good example of this phenomenon; 
z peace operations, especially in attempts at post-war reconstruction.32 The
growing importance of the gendarmerie in peacekeeping missions suggests
that the gendarmerie could contribute to peacekeeping in accordance with two
different formats: a civilian format on the one hand, consisting of securing the
theatre of operations; and a military format on the other hand, which would
consist of creating inter-African military police units within the regional African
stand-by forces. African crises are often characterised by the gravity of the
offences and crimes that have been committed, mostly against civilians, by
troublemakers; it has been suggested that the gendarmerie forces could act
as judiciary auxiliaries to the International Criminal Court. 
Such views have inspired a new project: the OGA (Organisation des
gendarmeries Africaines – African gendarmeries organisation). A Convention
setting up the OGA was signed and adopted by a number of Francophone African
countries belonging to three different areas in Francophone Africa: (1) North
(Maghreb, Mali and Niger); (2) Western Africa countries (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire,
Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea); and (3) Eastern and Central Africa (Chad,
RCA, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Djibouti and Madagascar).33 Senegal is
welcoming the Secretariat of the OGA; the Senegalese Gendarmerie High
Commander is currently entrusted with the function of OGA’s Secretary. On
20 June 2006, the French Minister of the Interior officially announced that France
was willing to support the setting up of an African gendarmerie force, similar to
the European gendarmerie force, which was launched within the framework of the
ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) (Franceschi 2006, 2007). 
3.4.5 The intelligence services
Not much is known about the intelligence agencies in Francophone Africa.
However, it is worth noting that their structures and functions are inspired by the
32 To some observers, post-conflict contexts can be seen as comparable to the internal turmoil
experienced by a number of European states during their nation-building processes, which led
governments to set up gendarmeries.
33 Each area has its own capital, namely Alger (area 1); Dakar (area 2) and Libreville (area 3). 
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French intelligence services, which have often assisted their implementation and
have ensured the training of their staff. More often than not, French intelligence
officers ran these services during the 1980s.
Generally, several services handle the collection of intelligence within the Ministry
of Defence and within the Ministry of the Interior. 
Within the Ministry of Defence, different Directorates generally handle the
collection of intelligence: on the one hand, the Directorate for External Security
(Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure – DGSE) is in charge of gathering
and analysing information relating to the security of the national territory; on the
other hand, the Directorate for military intelligence (Direction du renseignement
militaire – DRM) which is responsible to the General Staff, watches over the
protection of materials, staff and the installation of the National Defence
apparatus, against any hostile action or outside intervention. This office also
collects military information for the units that have engagements on the ground. 
In the national police forces (themselves part of the Ministry of the Interior as
mentioned above), there are also two services that are in charge of the collection
of intelligence: the General Intelligence (renseignements generaux – commonly
known as the RG); and the services of the territory surveillance (Direction de la
surveillance du territoire – DST).34 The search for information by the General
Intelligence service (RG) is, in essence, different from the type of information
looked for by the DST. The DST is an intelligence police service which supplies
defence intelligence that intends to discover the activities that are inspired,
engaged or supported by foreign states. The RG is more specialised in focusing
on internal political matters, especially on political opponents whether they are
domestic or exiled. 
For the most part, the intelligence services are another tool of political regimes. A
defining feature of the intelligence services in Francophone Africa is that there has
never been a tradition of effective oversight developed by the Parliaments, even
when provisions exist within the Constitutions. 
3.4.6 The paramilitary security services: customs
In Francophone Africa, customs services generally come under the responsibility
of the Ministry of Finance. They constitute a paramilitary body, that fall both under
the general statute of the public administration (civil status) and the military. These
are generally headed by a General Director, who has been appointed by decree
and is assisted by a deputy. The General Directorate is made up of several
directorates (central services), which themselves are sub-divided into sub-
directorates, desks and sections. The existing directorates are collectively made
up as follows:
z the legislation and customs techniques Directorate;
z the Human Resources Directorate;
z the customs receipts Directorate;
34 It is worth noting that in France, the RG and the DST have just been merged into one service.
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z the information and customs investigations Directorate; 
z the data processing Directorate;
z the statistics and economic studies Directorate;
z the external services directorate: these external services have territorial
competency and are generally divided between services that are involved in
commercial operations and with services that are involved in surveillance of
the territory. 
The customs services contribute to the definition of national policy taxation and
the implementation of it. Their mission is both fiscal and economic. Moreover, the
customs services have a role in security matters. This is accomplished by fighting
against fraud and the illegal importation of drugs, controlling the import of arms
and ammunition, as well as the identification of people at frontiers. The customs
services personnel are made up of two bodies:
z the sedentary body (Inspectors and controllers);
z the active body (officers and deputy-officers). 
Customs services have thus got a close relationship with the border police who
are in charge of coordinating security and surveillance activities that relate to
migrations along the territorial, aerial and maritime borders of countries. Finally,
the customs services have a national defence mission: they are meant to militarily
contribute to the protection and defence of national territory.
Nowadays, the influence of the regional organisations (CEDEAO, UEMOA,
CEMAC, CEEAC) increasingly restricts the role of national customs services. 
With regards to manpower, the customs services are generally understaffed: with
for instance 2,300 agents in Côte d’Ivoire; 1,164 in Burkina Faso; and 480 agents
in CAR. 
Customs officers generally have a very bad reputation and are seen as highly
corrupt. 
3.4.7 Private security companies
Due to the limitations and/or ineffectiveness of the public security forces, private
security companies have proliferated in Francophone Africa in the last few years. 
Firstly, it is important to stress the fact that private security has traditionally been
assimilated to the major influences that French or Belgian mercenaries – the most
famous of them being Bob Denard, Schramme, Tavernier and Hoare – have had
over security in Africa. These mercenaries were the same ageing fighters, the
same reserve officers, the same ex-non-commissioned officers of Belgian
commando groups, or from the French Foreign Legion. Their inexperience, and
their poor equipment, explains the mediocre quality of their numerous
performances and their bad reputation. 
Mercenaries of African origin have also been active in Francophone Africa
including in recent times. In 1997, in the former Zaire where President Joseph
35 Paul Barril’s employees spoke about him in the autumn of 2002, during a crisis in the Central African
Republic. This former gendarme created the Group Barril Sécurité after a career within the GIGN. The
Group Barril Sécurité includes several companies: Barril Investigation, Protection Conseil Sécurité,
Groupe Privé Barril, Activités sécuritaires, Security Action Store, Haute Protection. The Group Barril
Sécurité proposes several types of services: audit, and the detection of listening, close protection,
investigations, engineering, management of crises (among the crises, Paul Barril quotes ‘media
campaign of malicious gossip, blackmail, threats, detention, disappearance, kidnapping, judiciary
problems, terrorist threats, training and recruitment’).
36 Philippe Legorjus is also a former gendarme. In 1993, he created a small company: PHL Consultants,
whose purpose was to ‘accompany French companies in at risk zones to reassure their logistic and
financial operations’. The company Total is amongst his customers. In 1995, he created Atlantic
Intelligence, which specialised in economic intelligence. 
37 Robert Montoya also moved into private security after a career in the gendarmerie. He was very active
in Francophone Africa, through the group SAS (Security and Advisory Service), and owns the Géodis-
Calberson group, which was SAS’ first customer. Robert Montoya also leads Darkwood Logistique, a
transport company based in Togo. Today, Robert Montoya leads more than 2,500 people in seven
countries and proposes missions of advice and audit, security of persons and goods, airport security,
security of airline companies, accompanying export, and economic information. 
38 Jeannou Lacaze is the late joint Chief of Staff of the French military. The Lacaze’s group SAS
International employs about 2,500 people, and generally ensures the security of heads of states and
their families.
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Mobutu faced the armed rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a majority of
South African, Togolese and Angolan elements were identified. In 2002, Liberian
mercenaries supported the regime of General Robert Guéï in Côte d’Ivoire.
Mercenaries from Eastern and Central Europe have also been active in
Francophone Africa. In August 2004, President Gbagbo engaged Ukrainian
hunting pilots: besides the technical aid for the benefit of the Air Force, they were
brought in to directly assemble military operations on the ground, especially during
the bombardments of Zouan, Vavoua, and Gohitfala. 
Finally, French former members of the special forces, the elite units, the
gendarmerie, the Foreign Legion, the intelligence services, certain parachutist
regiments – or of the Department of Protection and Security (DPS) of the National
Front – participated in operations in Zaire (in 1997 and 2001), Madagascar (2002)
and in Côte d’Ivoire (2001–03).
However, from the mid-1990s (Leymarie 2004) onwards a new kind of private
security service has been emerging. There is a need to make a clear distinction
between the traditional mercenary organisations described above – whose
members are used to fighting in wars and overthrowing governments – and the new
private security companies which are increasingly operating as adjuncts to
governments to provide both advice and assistance on military/security matters.
These new kinds of private security companies can be found in democratic
Francophone countries as well as in dictatorial regimes. The distinctive
characteristics of the contemporary Anglo-Saxon PMCs (private military companies)
can only be applied with difficulty to private companies operating in Francophone
Africa. These structures remain small in size and are often highly specialised. A
number of those private security companies involve high ranking, retired, French
military officers (often former gendarmes, the most famous being Paul Barril,35
Philippe Legorjus,36 Robert Montoya37 and Jeannou Lacaze)38 and sometimes their
39 Amongst its leaders, we find former executives of the French armed forces. One of them was involved
in several mercenary operations in Africa.
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African counterparts. Some of these men were, for a long time, bound to the French
secret services; some became free to propose their services to big companies or to
African States. As they cannot rely on important governmental contracts (the French
government being traditionally very reluctant to officially resort to their services), the
French companies have directed their activities towards commercial customers
(private enterprises) and private customers (businessmen, diplomats, VIPs). The
services that are offered by French companies vary from close protection, training,
risk management and economic intelligence, to the protection of sites and mine
clearance. The customers are made up mainly of companies (Elf, Bouygues and
Total are among the most important). The services are often entrusted to former
soldiers but without real military implication. However, some of these companies
sometimes offer discreet training to African armed forces (instructions on shooting,
training of specialised, technical units of intervention): Robert Montoya’s company,
SAS (Security Advisory and Service), for instance, was particularly active in Togo
(training and equipment of the anti-riot forces of the General Eyadéma regime), in
Zaire and in the Gabon. Eric Sa’s company can be seen as the closest to
mercenary activities but on a small scale. Finally, two small private companies show
their ambition to compete with the Anglo-Saxon PMC:
z The group Earthwind Holding Corporation (EHC), created in 1999 and based
in Luxemburg, offers strategic and confidential advice to security services for
companies abroad, supporting international institutions and NGOs, training,
instruction and support for armed forces.39 Another branch of EHC is the
representative of the Northbridge Services Group, a British PMC, involved in
several projects in Africa (peace enforcement in the RDC, arrest of the
Liberian Charles Taylor, reassurance in Nigeria). Northbridge is therefore there
to recruit French-speaking staff via EHC. 
z Secopex, created in May, 2003 by former non-commissioned officers of the
parachutist regiment of the marines, ‘proposes a French alternative to Anglo-
Saxon know-how and is represented by the multiple American, British or South
African private military companies’. 
Finally, in all Francophone countries can be found a growing number of private
companies who mainly specialise in security guard provision. The growing number
of these kinds of private companies illustrates perfectly the growth of the demand
for protection services. A lot of African demobilised soldiers are employed by
these companies. In most Francophone African countries, these companies are
generally owned by French Nationals and sometimes by Lebanese individuals.
Even public organisations rely on their services. Some companies are also
increasingly active in humanitarian mine clearance. For instance, the IIC
(International Instruction Corps) have been on missions to clear mines in the
Central African Republic, and in Mauritania.
In some countries, (Mali, Cameroon) private security companies are only allowed
to carry out their activities if given an allowance by the Minister of Internal
Security. However, in most of the countries, there are no laws, decrees, licensing,
or provisions of the criminal code which govern the activities of the private security
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companies in Francophone African states: denomination of private companies,
kind of activities allowed (for instance, prohibition from maintaining order, from
providing surveillance linked to political and religious opinions, from preventing
freedom of movements of persons and vehicles), right to bear arms (which
category of weapons); and kinds of uniform, are not legally defined.
3.4.8 Vigilante groups and non-state security actors 
During the conflicts of the last two decades, private militias emerged in some
countries. In some of these countries, such as Niger and Mali, self-defence
groups were set up in nomadic areas in order to protect the nomadic population
from attacks and violent aggression. These self-defence groups were not provided
by a reliable security firm or by the State. The people in these regions organised
themselves into groups to protect their property (Arab, Tuaregs and Peulhs
communities). These groups have now developed a loose collaboration with the
forces of law and order. In rural areas of CAR, villagers organised themselves into
self-protection units in order to protect their communities from the attacks
launched by rebel groups, governmental forces or organised criminals. Following
the reduction of the budget of the national security forces, the inhabitants of urban
centres have similarly paid individuals to ensure their protection. 
In addition, on the margins of the state, another kind of militia has emerged in a
number of the Francophone countries: involving both criminal groups (e.g.
coupeurs de route, gangs) and security officials (customs and police officers),
these militias illustrate the rise of informal networks which thwart the formal
structures that are supposed to be in place. For instance, the coupeurs de route
phenomenon appeared in Cameroon during the 1980s. Initially very sporadic and
limited to the extreme north, the north and the Adamaoua regions, it has tended to
extend during the past few years, to other parts of the country, particularly the
east, the west and the centre (Fogue 2007; Roitman 2004). This phenomenon has
been expanding due to Cameroon’s economic situation, and to the chronic
instability in its neighbouring countries, particularly in CAR and Chad and, to a
lesser extent, in Nigeria. The CAR’s ‘zaraguinas’ (as Central Africans call the
coupeurs de route) are more and more of a presence in the northern and eastern
parts of Cameroon. 
The coupeurs de route is both a rural and urban phenomenon. The coupeurs de
route operate along roads, as well as at the boundaries of towns and villages. This
phenomenon is closely linked to trans-border insecurity and to the circulation of
light weapons. Generally made up of 3 to 30 members, these groups sometimes
operate with the complicity of the population. Ambush, disembowelment of
domestic cattle, kidnapping, holdups, and murders are their main modes of
operating. Initially led by amateurs, who were unskilled and mostly unemployed
young people, these attacks have been increasingly set up by professionals. A
number of deserter soldiers as well as some former rebel group combatants
operating in Chad and CAR, have switched to this new occupation and have joined
coupeurs de route groups. The porosity of the borders enables them to operate on
the territories of the three countries. The coupeurs de route have been able to
obtain very sophisticated equipment (e.g. satellite transmission equipment, war
weapons) which strengthens their operational capabilities. They also specialise
40 The 1959 Ordinance and the Decree of 1962 are the backbone of the legal framework for budgeting
in France. However, on 1 August 2001 financial law included the introduction of a results-oriented
budget, accrual accounting, an annual certification by the Public Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) and
an increase in legislative control. 
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increasingly in gun trafficking. The coupeurs de route phenomenon has resulted in
important population displacements, infrastructure destruction, as well as the
looting of wildlife and terrorising of the population. A lot of people have been
reported dead after attacks led by the coupeurs de route (111 from January to
August 2007). The cross-border dynamics of this phenomenon confer it to a sub-
regional dimension. 
3.4.8.1 Funding provisions
There are a lot of commonalities between the French40 and the Francophone
public expenditure management (PEM) systems in terms of legal settings, rules
and procedures. However, there are marked differences in audit and external
controls between Francophone states (Abdourahmane and Crouzel 2004;
Sangaré 2006). According to a survey led by the IMF (Yaya 2004), Francophone
African countries share roughly 57 per cent to 74 per cent of the French public
expenditure management system: Benin is the closest to France, followed by
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, while Congo and Togo reflect the greatest differences. The
commonality between the French system and the Francophone African states is
very strong with regards to the cash plan, the description of expenditure
processes and internal control. But there are marked differences with audit and
external control, on accounting and on reporting systems. 
3.4.9 The legal and institutional environment of budgeting
In France, as in most Francophone African countries, Parliament has the first and
last word with regard to the use of public money. The approval of the budget by
Parliament is a prerequisite for the executive branch to use public money. 
The vote by Parliament authorises the executive branch to spend through
appropriations of credits. There are three broad categories of appropriations: the
most common category is the capped appropriations (crédits limitatifs): as a general
rule, spending commitments and orders to pay are capped by the budget law. The
next two types of appropriations are exceptions and their amounts are provisional.
The first type is the provisional appropriations (crédits provisionnels). The
government can supplement these appropriations from other sources. A typical case
is the spending necessitated by natural disasters. The second type of exceptional
appropriations is the estimated appropriations (crédits évaluatifs). The budget
figures are only estimated and they can be increased (through debt repayment and
litigation costs): the defence budget often comes from this category. 
Furthermore, the budgeting process is embedded in four key principles: 
z unity: the budget should contain all government revenues and expenditures,
even if three different parts – general budget, ancillary (budgets annexes) and
Treasury special accounts (comptes spéciaux du Trésor) – detail the content
of the budget better and constitute the budget law; 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
49
z annuality: the budget is approved and executed on an annual basis; 
z universality: all government revenues and expenditures are incorporated in the
budget
z specialty, which allows Parliament to authorise the executive branch to spend
not just the overall budget, but specified categories of credit, which is
categorised by ministries.
The central principle of a treasury single account ensures that the government, via
the Treasury, concentrates its cash resources into one account, usually held at the
Central Bank. Local governments and public agencies should then deposit all their
funds with the Treasury. Hence, the Treasury is a pool emanating from different
entities. The unicity of the cash desk (unité de caisse) is the corollary. 
Different actors are involved in the budgeting process. The executive branch,
notably the Minister of Finance, under the supervision of the prime minister,
prepares a draft budget after consultation with the ministries who are doing the
spending. The budget is executed by the executive branch through four main
phases: engagement (origination of the spending), liquidation (validation of the
expenditure), ordonnancement (order to pay) and payment (disbursement of
money to honour the government’s engagement). The ex-post control is
performed by the Parliament and by the Public Audit Office (Cour des Comptes).
There is a strict segregation of duties between those who administer budget
appropriation and those who actually manipulate the cash. The first three
functions (engagement, liquidation and ordonnancement) are carried out by the
ordonnateurs whereas the last one is carried out by the comptable or public
accountant. This segregation establishes a mechanism of mutual control between
those who commit the government and those who make the actual payment. 
However, this PEM system is subject to two main exceptions which allow the
executive branch to bypass Parliament on budgetary matters in specific
exceptional circumstances:
z government secret funds (fonds spéciaux) which the government doesn’t have
to justify and usually relates to national security matters;
z the cash advance funds (régies d’avance) which, for practical reasons, are
designed to remedy the lengthy spending procedures. 
3.4.9.1 Control of budget execution
There are three types of budget control:
z administrative control by the administration of internal bodies. Internally, these
controls are operated by the financial controller at the origination phase of the
spending process (engagement), and by the accountant at the payment phase
(paiement). Spending ministries also have their own internal controlling bodies.
These administrative controls are meant to check that laws and regulations
are complied with; 
z parliamentary control exercised by Parliament. Parliamentary control is
external. The control prerogatives of Parliament are defined by the
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Constitution. Three types of budget law are passed by the Parliament: the
initial budget law (loi de finance initiale), which includes all annual government
revenues and expenditures; the supplementary budget law (loi de finance
rectificative), which modifies the initial budget during its execution; and the
budget review law (loi de règlement), which reconciles the executed budget
with the initial budget following the closure of the fiscal year, and certifies that
the budget has been executed in conformity with prior legislative
authorisations. Besides these, Parliament can also set up ad hoc committees
to investigate any misuse of public money by the executive branch. In fact, the
control of the executed budget by Parliament remains largely symbolic: the
Parliament can only validate the reconciliation of the accounts that have
already been carried out; 
z jurisdictional control carried out by the Public Audit Office (Cour des Comptes).
The Cour des Comptes is an independent jurisdiction taken from both the
executive and the legislative branches of government. Its attributes are defined
by the Constitution. It performs financial audits (accounts held by the public
accountants) as well as performance audits (observance of the principles of
economy, effectiveness and efficiency in the use of public money). The Public
Audit Office also audits agencies that benefit from government funding.
However, it has no control over credit managers: it judges the accounts, not the
accountants. 
The a priori controls of the first (origination) and last (payment) phases of the
expenditure process are a key feature of the French PEM system. Conversely, the
control of the executed budget by the Parliament is in fact mostly symbolic, given
that the Parliament only validates the reconciliation of the accounts already
carried out by the account-centralising body within the Ministry of Finance on the
one hand and by the Public Office of Account on the other hand. 
Finally, there is the unlimited responsibility of public accountants (who are personally
financially responsible for any irregularities in the management of funds that they
are entrusted with); whilst the ordonnateur,41 auditor, (who can administer credits
and gives orders for payments) enjoys partial immunity. Consequently, ministers and
elected officials are not subject to the Budgetary and Financial Discipline Court,
which comprises magistrates of the Public Account Office and members of the State
Council (Conseil d’Etat). Ministers cannot be tried in court, whereas members of
their cabinet and other civil servants can be legally prosecuted. Furthermore, an
adverse judgement does not generally imply the repair of financial prejudices.
Sanctions are mostly symbolic and based on reputations. 
3.4.9.2 Commonalities and differences between the French system and African
Francophone countries
The similarities between the French system and the systems of the Francophone
African countries are very strong with regard to their cash plans and their outlines
of the process and internal control of expenditure. Francophone African countries
are similar to France in their legal and institutional ways of budgeting, for instance
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the control of government by Parliament through the voting of budget law;
supplementary budget review laws and budget review laws with an adherence to
a deadline for the formulation and execution of budgets. Moreover, Francophone
countries are similar to France with regards to: their expenditure processes that
follow the engagement/liquidation/ordonnacement/payment phases; the a priori
control by the financial controller at the level of engagement; the a priori control
performed by the public accountant; the distinction between the ordonnateur who
can give the order to pay out, and the accountant who actually does the paying;
the deadline for committing the government, and for ordering payments during a
fiscal year; the liquidation phase and the expenditure procedures that are
simplified for petty cash spending. 
However, although Francophone African countries have historically borrowed
largely from the French budgeting system, they have in practice departed from the
original model. There are a lot of differences between France and Francophone
African countries in auditing, in external control, in accounting and in reporting.
Although budgeting control institutions exist on paper, in practice they work very
poorly. The parliament budgetary role is very weak and their budgetary
prerogatives (vote of initial, supplementary and review budget laws, as well as
control of the executive branches) are, in fact, largely symbolic. Most of the time,
it is very difficult to clearly appraise the amount of the security budget since this is
divided between several governmental bodies and policy areas. The Francophone
African countries are very different from France with regards to the ordonnateur
and of the degree of consolidation of the budget. Most of the Francophone African
states generally do have a centralised structure with an ordonnnateur unique who
often is part of the Ministry of Finance, while in France all Ministers are
ordonnateurs for spending by their ministries. The monopoly that is held by the
Ministry of Finance is a defining feature of systems in Francophone Africa. 
Furthermore, there is another distinctive feature with regards to the defence
sector: in a lot of countries, the Ministry of Defence does not have any control
over the defence budget. It is the President, rather than the Ministry of Defence,
who considers the budget as his monopoly and can give payment orders (even for
minor expenses such as fuel and ammunitions), managing the budget completely
under secretive rules. Consequently, exceptional spending procedures are often
overused. 
Besides, in Francophone Africa it is only the central Government’s operations that
are mostly recorded and budget consolidation is therefore very weak. The
differences with France are particularly striking with regard to fiscal reporting and
budgetary computerisation. In a lot of Francophone countries consolidated
treasury balances are not frequent and budget construction is mostly manual. In
the best case scenario, executed budgets are published with very long delays
(often more than five years after their closing date). Long delays are also
observed in voting on the budget review laws. The information flow between the
budget Directorate and the treasury is irregular. And, as a consequence of a badly
monitored execution budget, the Treasury’s data is often incomplete or incorrect. 
In practice, normal budget processes are often bypassed and often recourse is
made to exceptional spending procedures: these are particularly widespread in
the defence sector where spending rules are often circumvented, while extra-
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budgetary spending and political interference is more frequent. The real levels of
payment are difficult to assess, due to the length of administrative spending
processes and the lack of efficient control. The reliability of fiscal data is also often
questionable. 
Finally, audit and external controls are the weakest links of the Francophone PEM
systems. In many African countries the supreme audit institutions are either quite
recently formed or they do not exist, in spite of Constitutional provisions that
mention such offices. Public audit offices in Cameroon, the DRC and the CAR
have been created but are not operational. Where they do exist, public audit
offices are ill-equipped and under-staffed and do not have skilled members of
staff. Most importantly, Government auditors are not independent from the
executive branch, except in Senegal. Government accounts are rarely checked by
the supreme audit institution. In countries such as Chad, Cameroon and Togo, the
accounts have never been verified.
In fact, Francophone African countries have imported the French budgeting
system without the required human and technical capacities. While France itself is
now moving towards a new budgeting system (the New Organic Budget Law),
Francophone African countries also need to devise budgeting systems tailored to
their specific needs. To do so, it is more than urgent in these countries to develop
a better knowledge of the informal processes in which budgeting processes are
rooted. 
3.5 Research on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Francophone Africa
Carrying out documentary research into institutional security development in
Francophone Africa is a real challenge: there is little information and few materials
– either at primary and secondary source that are available in the public domain.
Only a few states have compiled the statutory rules of their Public Service, and
texts relating to the special statute that characterise most of the defence and
security forces in Francophone African states are unavailable. As a consequence,
priority must be given to European or North American research or documentation
centres when carrying out documentary research into the security sector of an
African Francophone country. In addition, there are no organised SSR-focused
research capabilities of any importance that can be identified in Francophone
Africa. Individual academics – rather than research centres, networks or think
tanks – are working on SSR topics in isolation. However, it is important to note
that these people, if not numerous, do generally have a very deep understanding
of the African Francophone security systems (see for instance N’Diaye 2007;
Agokla 2010; Sangaré 2006; Toulabor 2005; Bryden 2008; Petiteville 1996). Most
of the time, these individuals belong to research centres that are specialised in
international relations, strategic studies or geopolitics. A lot of Francophone
practitioners have also developed very specialised skills in the field of security
reform. If connected to a strong network, these academics and practitioners could
bring invaluable contributions to the SSR in Francophone Africa. 
It is important to acknowledge the fact that there are difficulties in conducting
research in most of Africa; most singularly, Francophone Africa constitutes in
some cases, a wilful obstacle to knowledge production for analysis and sound
42 France then decided to welcome fewer African trainees into its own military schools. 
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policy formulation. It is in itself a major hurdle to the improvement of security
provision, and stability. Furthermore, the ‘secrets’ that these practices are
supposed to protect are often common knowledge.
3.6 Military schools and police academies in Francophone Africa
In Francophone Africa, a very strong network of military schools and police
academies has been implemented. Of special interest is the concept of ENVR
(Ecoles nationales a vocation regionale – National schools with regional vocation).
The ENVR concept was first launched in the 1980s by the French military
cooperation services; it was renewed in 1998. The ENVR aim is to adapt the
training that is traditionally given in French military schools to the particularities of
the African continent.42 Moreover, the scarce resources of the African countries are
less and less likely to provide the funding necessary to support national
specialised schools: the ENVR aims to mutualise the costs of training, by avoiding
duplications. 
The ENVR are meant to welcome trainees who come from all Francophone
countries; they promote a regional approach to security on the continent. French
coopérants always define the training curriculum and head up the division of
study. 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the available positions are booked for trainees
who originate from the host nation. Trainees have to pass an entrance
examination to have access to the schools. Some of these schools are called
upon to work closely with regional organisations and with the African Union (AU)
and to become excellence training centres for the AU stand-by brigades in the
long run. 
Currently, there are 14 ENVRs in Africa, located in ten Francophone countries:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo in West Africa, and
Cameroon and Gabon in Central Africa. There are three major kinds of training:
z military general training;
z support of peace operations;
z specialised training. 
Fifty different types of training are proposed in the 14 ENVRs (see Annex). A
number of these training areas are bilingual (French/English). 
Trainees come from 31 African countries: even if the ENVR mainly welcomes
Francophone trainees, they are increasingly welcoming trainees from Anglophone
countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania) and Lusophone (Angola,
Mozambique) Africa. In addition to the ENVR, a growing number of national
schools welcome trainees from other Francophone countries. 
Two other ENVRs are about to be set up: the High Joint Defence Training Centre
(Cours supérieur Interarmées de Défense) in Yaoundé (Cameroon) and the
Transmission School in Manea (Guinea). 
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4 Comparison between security
systems in Francophone and
Anglophone Africa
This section aims to provide a better understanding of the institutional,
bureaucratic and legal security arrangements operating in Francophone and
Anglophone African countries, highlighting their commonalities and differences.
This section does not attempt to provide a performance rating of Francophone
and Anglophone security apparatus nor does it define performance benchmarks
against which security apparatus should be systematically assessed. It only
consists of a general overview presenting the core differences between security
systems in Francophone and Anglophone African countries. 
Those differences, developed below in more detail, can be summarised as
follows:
z The ability to enact SSR in the absence of broader governance reforms
frameworks (such as public sector reform structures) in many Francophone
African countries;
z The different level of influence of the former colonial powers in the
governance of the security sector, France having been much more involved in
the management of the security apparatus of its former colonies than the UK;
z The absence of national security councils in Francophone Africa similar to
those that can be found in an important number of Anglophone countries;
z The important role of civilian bureaucracies within a number of Ministries of
Defence in Anglophone countries with no equivalent in Francophone Africa;
z The improvement and growing professionalisation of military justice in an
important number of Anglophone countries whilst only a few number of
Francophone countries have addressed this challenge;
z The fact that it is acceptable in Francophone countries for the military to be
involved in humanitarian or development projects;
z The existence of armed forces (such as the National Guard and
gendarmeries) with no counterparts in Anglophone countries: those forces,
particularly the gendarmeries, are institutionally endowed with police missions;
z The introduction of sector-wide budgets for security in some Anglophone
countries;
z The introduction of oversight mechanisms of the intelligence services in South
Africa with no equivalent in most of the other African countries, be they
Francophone or Anglophone;
z The institutionalisation of a strong research and expertise capacity on SSR-
related issues in Anglophone Africa whilst Francophone expertise is
fragmented and carried out outside any structured networks;
z The existence in Francophone Africa of a large network of military schools and
police academies which are welcoming trainees at the regional level.
43 The author wishes to thank Jeffrey Isima for the very useful inputs on the security sector in
Anglophone Africa that he has provided.
44 While periodic elections are held in all of these countries, there are marked diversities in Anglophone
Africa, in terms of the substance of democratic governance, ranging from consolidating democracies at
the upper echelon to electoral civilian autocracies, such as Zimbabwe and Eritrea at the bottom of the
ladder. The most glaring example of a consolidating democracy, in terms of institution density and
governance processes, is South Africa. Others not too far behind are Ghana, Tanzania and Mauritius.
Countries where the democratisation project is progressing are Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. In a
number of other countries, democratisation has been blocked by the regime itself, especially those
regimes that have stayed in power for long periods. Examples are Namibia, Uganda, Botswana,
Sudan and Ethiopia, where a multiparty constitution is in place, but the ruler’s party has remained in
power for decades within the framework of democratic rule. The significant rise in the role of military
and security forces in politics in some other countries with a history of prolonged military rule (such as
Nigeria) has consequently ensured that the transition to democracy is being manipulated, or even
initiated, for the political survival of rulers with deep roots in the military.
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4.1 Security reforms in Francophone and Anglophone Africa43
There are currently no military regimes in Anglophone countries in the region,
although the military still plays an important role in governance and the economy,
as many of the civilian leaders and business elites are either former military
officers or ex-guerrilla fighters (Cawthra 2003; Ebo 2005; Edigheji 2005; Howe
2000; Ibrahim 2003). The transition to democracy in Nigeria in 1999 marked the
end of direct military rule in Anglophone Africa. This is a major difference with
Francophone Africa where unconstitutional changes of government driven or
supported by the military have recently proliferated (cf. above: Mauritania, Guinea
and Madagascar). Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius and Uganda have evolved
over time into relatively mature and sophisticated security forces by regional
standards. In Ethiopia, the original security structures with Marxist leanings have
been ideologically transformed to fit into a neoliberal state. In Eritrea (which broke
away from Ethiopia in 1993) the guerrilla forces have been re-organised and
modernised into modern military and police forces. South Africa has been able to
reform the defence and security forces inherited from the apartheid regimes in
order to integrate former rival combatants (Hughes 2007; Rupiya 2005). 
Furthermore, whilst a number of Anglophone African countries have entered a
process of reform, Francophone African countries have barely experienced any
significant transformation in security governance. Anglophone countries have
arguably been more open to changes in the direction of increased accountability
(Ministries of Defence relatively independent from the armed forces;
parliamentarian oversight; accountability to audit bodies, ombudsman, human
rights commissions, etc.) than their Francophone equivalents. This may partly
reflect variations in their respective democratic transition processes.44 But another
factor has been the active promotion of SSR itself in Anglophone countries by
bilateral donors (especially by the UK) – together with some cross-fertilisation
among Anglophone countries (led by non-state organisations such as ASSN,
SADESM etc), as well as the effects of the South African model. In a few
countries where institutional neglect has led to institutional criminalisation and
decomposition, and leading to the eventual collapse of the state itself, security
structures are being reconstituted within the rubric of post-war reconstruction
under the tutelage of international or regional actors. This is the case in Sierra
45 Liberia and Sierra Leone have national structures in charge of state reform. The Liberian Governance
Reform Commission was established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003, which ended
the war in that country. This Commission which was established to promote the principles of good
governance, is independent, being made up of seven permanent members appointed by a Chairman
who is from civil society. In Sierra Leone, a Governance Reform Secretariat was established as part of
the Ministry for Presidential Affairs to coordinate all governance reform initiatives (Gbla 2007). 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
56
Leone and Liberia (Aboagye 2005), where the main security forces have been
overwhelmed by social forces and de-legitimised by their infamous roles during
the war, and are therefore being transformed into more effective, accountable and
professional forces in a democratic environment.45 Stable countries such as
Ghana have also experienced a noticeable improvement of security governance.
The situation is of course far from ideal: in a lot of countries, security ministries
still tend to be weak and badly resourced; the mechanisms of ‘horizontal’
accountability – to audit bodies, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, etc. –
are weak in essence whilst military forces have fared better than the police forces.
But it cannot be denied that security governance has been improving in an
important number of Anglophone countries over the last few years. 
As mentioned above, Francophone African countries are usually presented as not
having experienced any significant transformation in security governance. The
seizure of power by the military – or with their complicity – in several States
(Mauritania, Guinea, and Madagascar) is seen as dramatic evidence of the total
lack of improvement in security governance. However, the situation is much more
complex. It is important to be aware that, in fact, a rather important number of
countries, including non-democratic ones, have entered stealthily into a process of
reform. Most of the time, these reform processes have been undertaken and framed
without the SSR label. A number of reform processes have been launched at the
initiative of national authorities and they are undoubtedly resulting in more
professional and more accountable security forces, which is the overarching
purpose of the SSR approach. In Mali, security sector functioning has been
improved in terms of oversight and supervision (especially as regards budgeting
processes) and the armed forces are becoming more professional. Senegal –
where the armed forces have clearly improved their professional skills and their
democratic behaviour (thanks in part to their participation in peacekeeping missions)
since the early 1960s – is also interesting, even if the reform process has been to a
large extent limited to the armed forces, whilst the police sector has been left behind
and the oversight and supervision mechanisms (parliaments, ombudsmen, audit
account) are increasingly weak. The case of Togo is a very telling example of
security reform processes occurring in non-democratic environments (UNREC 2008).
In addition, three Francophone countries (two former Belgian colonies and one
former French colony) have entered into ambitious security reform processes,
under the pressure of the international community:
z the DRC, where security structures have entered a huge process of reform
(the outcome of which is, however, very uncertain);
z Burundi;
z the Central African Republic, where the reform process is the first example of
a holistic approach to SSR. 
46 Direct British military/police engagement in Sierra Leone has been much greater than at any time
since the East African mutinies of 1964.
47 In particular, the South African paradigms have been hugely influential, being distinct from the British
model, which is much narrower and offers less scope for accountability.
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In these countries, however, SSR processes seem to be disconnected from the
more global public reforms, contrary to what can be found in some post-conflict
Anglophone countries. 
4.1.1 Legacy of the colonial and post-colonial order
It is possible to identify distinct Anglophone and Francophone institutional patterns
of security sector governance, rooted in colonial legacies (Rouvez 1994;
Somerville 1990) as well as in ongoing relationships with the ex-colonial power.
4.1.1.1 Type of presence 
A major difference between Francophone and Anglophone Africa is the degree of
involvement by the former colonial powers in the governance of security structures
during the post-colonial area. 
For the most part, the British, unlike the French (see Section 2.2), withdrew from
close security relationships with their ex-colonies soon after independence. In
some countries, the British were in fact pushed out (the abrogation of defence
agreements by Ghana and Nigeria, for instance). The British support most of the
time took the form of periodic interventions by the BMATT (British Military Advisory
Training Team). Only a few long-standing arrangements – like British support for
the Command and Staff College in Ghana – can be mentioned. Kenya, however,
is a specific case, as British security involvement arguably continued post-
independence to a greater extent than in other ex-British countries. A trend toward
more multilateral forms of support has been inaugurated by the British support for
peacekeeping training in the Kofi Annan Centre. The UK’s recent SSR and post-
conflict involvements have partly altered this situation, committing it to a much
higher level of security engagement than at any time since the 1960s. In Sierra
Leone, the UK has reverted to something much closer to French levels of
engagement.46 Finally, British support to SSR can be viewed as part of such a re-
engagement: SSR programmes tended to reflect and promote British and wider
Commonwealth paradigms of security governance.47 However, direct British
military involvement in Sierra Leone was limited to a few months in 2001 and the
BMATT quickly became international (International Military Advisory Training Team
– IMATT). SSR programmes have added new forms of engagement to traditional
British assistance, aiming not only to train but also to reshape security
architectures, improve accountability, strengthen oversight capacities (e.g. of
Parliaments), improve budgeting procedures, assist defence and security reviews,
etc. SSR programmes imply a deeper level of engagement than the French
military presence in Francophone countries, which arguably stabilised existing
relationships, rather than seeking to transform them. British engagements in SSR
– alongside other donors and international agencies – are new and arguably more
intrusive forms of engagement. This change of emphasis has less to do with a
48 South Africa is almost unique in combining Presidential with vigorous Parliamentary governance.
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deeper defence relationship than the arrival of new actors, especially the
Department for International Development (DFID) in the security field.  
It is also paramount to recognise that French permanent cooperation (as
described in Section 2.2) can be seen as a particular approach to SSR, in fact a
more traditional one. France has developed a very segmented approach to SSR;
there were no links between the reforms allegedly led in the defence, police,
justice and customs sectors. Furthermore, French security cooperation has not
traditionally been focused on security governance (e.g. role of Parliaments, Audit
Accounts, the media, civil societies). France has recently tried to update its
approach by publishing its own SSR Manual, inspired by the DAC/OECD
principles (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/12-Ang-MAEE-RSS-final.pdf,
accessed 8 March 2010). 
4.1.1.2 Types of institutional arrangement
All Francophone countries have centralised presidential systems, in which
security bureaucracies report directly or indirectly to the President. Although
Anglophone countries in theory have an inherited tradition of Parliamentary
government, in reality Presidential control has prevailed in all of them. In practice,
however, in almost all African countries there has been centralisation under
Presidential authority. Therefore, the direct Presidential authority and control in
security matters cannot be seen as a defining feature of the security architecture
in Francophone countries:48 in many cases Presidentialism was further reinforced
by authoritarian governance and its legacies – in both Anglophone and
Francophone countries. 
4.1.1.2.1 The central role of the President
As mentioned above, in Francophone Africa, a series of post-colonial and policy
variables have combined to create a situation whereby the security sector is
working alongside structures that were largely inherited from the French model.
The legacy of colonialism and then the adoption of Constitutions inspired by the
French Fifth Republic Constitution – if not a carbon copy of it – has resulted in a
concentration of power in the Executive. 
There is more uniformity in the institutional arrangements of the Francophone
African states than in Anglophone Africa. It can be argued that British
disengagement permitted greater institutional diversity among Anglophone
countries, making it harder to discern common trends and patterns among them.
Initially, institutional arrangements in most Anglophone countries reflected the
distinctively British heritage, e.g. Parliamentary government, common law, sharp
separation in principle between external defence and internal policing, and hence
between military and police, etc. However, most Anglophone countries have
shifted toward Presidential governance, not least in relation to the security sector
– hence tending to converge with French-speaking countries where
presidentialism was part of the initial colonial legacy. Furthermore, in Anglophone
Africa, security governance influences stem from elsewhere than the United
49 Yet only a few of these constitutions are popular and uncontroversial. Apart from South Africa, Ghana
and Zambia, most current constitutions in Anglophone Africa were written and enacted by outgoing
military regimes and single-party dictatorships or civilian autocracies and semi-democracies, all of
which have ensured that long-held political and economic prerogatives of past ruling elites are
guaranteed under the new ‘democratic’ dispensation.
59
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 64
Kingdom institutional tradition – either from widespread links with other
Commonwealth countries (e.g. training of security personnel elsewhere in the
Commonwealth) or from the USA – e.g. in Nigeria where the Federal Constitution,
Presidential government, the bicameral legislature and its select committees, etc.,
reflect the US influence even more than the British. 
The US influence is of course also paramount in Liberia. More broadly, it is worth
noting that constitutional provisions inspired by the US Presidentialist Constitution
have been integrated in a number of Anglophone as well as Francophone
countries, especially the provision entitling the President of the Republic to be
Supreme Chief of the armed forces. Currently nearly all the constitutions in the
former British colonies, (with the exception of Ethiopia, Lesotho and Swaziland),
have adopted the Presidential system of government, as opposed to the
Westminster parliamentary system inherited at independence. This marks a sharp
departure from the British tradition and rather adhere to the strong American
presidential system in the process of Africanisation.49 The Constitutions stipulate
that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and has
ultimate powers to determine the operational use of all security forces. The
President also appoints the ministers in charge of the Ministries of Defence, Home
(Internal) Affairs and Intelligence. The President also has the executive powers to
appoint the operational commanders of the security forces such as the Chief of
Defence and the service Chiefs in charge of Army, Air and Navy (some countries
do not have all three services), as well as the Inspector General of Police (called
Commissioner in some countries), and the Inspector General of Intelligence. From
this perspective, constitutional frameworks in Anglophone Africa are more than
similar to those of Francophone Africa. However, a major difference stems from the
existence of collegial organisations meant to be fully associated in the decision-
making process: in almost all Anglophone countries, the appointments and
decisions are supposedly made on the advice of the National Security Council, the
Defence Council and the Police Council, which are established to advise the
President on policy matters relating to the respective services (see below). 
Finally, after independence, influence from the ex-Soviet bloc has been a factor
both in several Anglophone countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Ethiopia,
Namibia, etc.), but also in several Francophone countries (Guinea, Mali, Congo
Brazzaville, etc.).
4.1.1.2.2 The absence or weakness of collegial decision-making structures (national security
and police councils) in Francophone countries
In almost all Anglophone countries, appointments and decisions are supposedly
made on the advice of collegial organisations which are established to advise the
President on policy matters relating to security, and consequently have an
important role in the policy decision-making process. The Cabinet is the highest
decision-making organ of government and this includes national security policy.
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Moreover, from a decade ago, a number of countries have introduced structures
and policy review processes (such as Defence Reviews and/or National Security
Reviews, White Papers) whilst interagency decision-making structures have been
set up. At the top of all national security organisations is the National Security
Council (NSC), which coordinates all security policy and advises the President on
national security matters. The NSC, which is under the direct control of the
Presidency, is managed by a National Security Adviser (as in Nigeria) or a
National Security Coordinator (as in Ghana and Sierra Leone). The meetings of
the NSC are presided over by the President and are made up of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Interior, and Finance, and such other Ministers as
the President determines. Other members of the NSC are the Chief of Defence
Staff (or Force Commander as is known alternatively), the Inspector General of
Police and the Directors of the various Intelligence agencies. The influence of
these NCSs of course varies from case to case. 
Two other important national organisations that can be found in a lot of
Anglophone countries are the Defence Council and the Police Council:
z Known as the Armed Forces Council in some countries (for example, in Ghana
and the Gambia), the Defence Council is principally responsible for advising
the President on Defence policy and acts as a mechanism for executive
control and supervision of the defence forces. It is usually chaired by the
President, but in a few other countries (such as Ghana) the Vice-President is
the Chair. Other members include the Ministers of Foreign Defence, Foreign
Affairs, and the Interior, the Chief of Defence Staff as well as the service
chiefs; the President may appoint other members. The Defence Council is only
advisory and in practice presidents do make defence related decisions without
recourse to it, particularly in countries with weaker democratic credentials. In
Botswana for instance, the Defence Council has not met for many years. 
z The Police Council is principally responsible for advising the President on
internal public security and safety policy. The Police Council has in some
countries the Vice-President (as in Ghana), and others, the President (Nigeria)
as its Chair person, while other members include the Minister of Interior,
Inspector General of Police (also known as Police Commissioner in some of
the countries), Attorney General, and other members whom the President may
appoint. 
In Francophone Africa, beyond the Council of ministers (under the authority of the
prime minister) which is in theory the first level of coordination, there are no
integrated processes combining external defence, internal security, policing, etc.
within a single policy frame, coordinated at the national level that can be seen as
comparable to the NSC. In most of the countries however, it was mentioned above
(in section 3.4.1) that the Constitution sets up High Councils on the National
Defence Council which are in fact rather similar to the Defence Councils that can
be found in Anglophone Africa, including as regards their lack of real influence. The
High Councils on National Defence are most of the time ‘empty shells’. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that key decisions, both in Anglophone and
Francophone Africa are not discussed in the formal structures: informal, behind-
the-scenes decision-making is often more important. 
50 Botswana is the only country where there is no Ministry of Defence or defence bureaucracy. A minister
in the Presidency is responsible for defence matters.
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4.1.1.2.3 Role of Parliament
In Anglophone Africa, parliamentary oversight of the security services is provided
for in most of the constitutions. Under Presidential constitutions, Parliament is
empowered to make laws for the regulation of the constitutional powers of the
President as Commander in Chief of the security services. This parliamentary
oversight is to be exercised through a number of mechanisms. As in Francophone
Africa, parliaments are empowered to form select committees on particular
security services for the purpose of oversight. Apart from Lesotho and Malawi, all
national parliaments in Anglophone Africa have select committees responsible for
oversight of the security sector. In larger parliaments, like Nigeria’s and South
Africa’s, the Parliament has separate committees on Defence (in addition to
Defence, the Senate in Nigeria has a committee for the Army, Air Force and
Navy), Police (Safety and Security in South Africa) and Intelligence. In smaller
parliaments, such as that of Zambia and Ghana, Defence and the Interior are
combined under one committee. There are also committees on Appropriation and
Public Accounts, which are meant to debate, approve and review defence, internal
security and intelligence budgets. In addition, the committees have powers to
conduct investigations into security matters, and to review the management of
security by the executive branch as the need arises. This includes the power to
summon the President, ministers or heads of the security services to Parliament
to defend their actions.
The role of parliaments, as acknowledged by the constitutions, is therefore very
similar in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. However, in the two sets of
countries, the constitutional provisions related to parliamentarian oversight have
been more than often ignored in practice. 
4.1.2 The armed forces
4.1.2.1 Organisation of the Defence Ministry
An important difference between Francophone and Anglophone Africa is related to
the division within the Ministries of Defence themselves. In almost all Anglophone
countries, the Ministry of Defence (or Department of Defence) is organised along
British lines and Western tradition: MoD structures in former British colonies tend
to reflect a simplified version of the structures of the past, rather than the
organisation of the UK MoD today. The operational commands of the forces
usually work together with a civilian bureaucracy of respective ministries. At the
head of the Ministry is a civilian minister appointed by the President, except for
Lesotho, where the prime minister is the Minister of Defence; and Swaziland and
Mauritius, where the minister is appointed by the prime minister from the
parliament.50 The Ministry of Defence, which is responsible for development and
implementation of national defence policy, is made up of a Defence Secretariat
(defence bureaucracy) and a defence headquarters, which are headed by the
(Permanent) Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff (known as
Force Commander in some countries), respectively. The Secretary is the chief
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accounting officer for the Ministry and advises the Minister of Defence on policy
matters. The Chief of Defence Staff is responsible for the operational command of
the armed forces and advises the minister on operational matters related to
national defence. The Ministry is therefore a crucial mechanism for civil control
and executive supervision of the armed forces.
4.1.2.2 The Republican/Presidential Guards
As mentioned above, presidential Guards or similar, with special responsibility for
regime security, are pretty much universal in Francophone Africa. 
A number of Anglophone countries have had negative experiences of the
Presidential Guard in former times. In Ghana, Nkrumah established the
President’s Own Guard Regiment in the 1960s. Jerry Rawlings also had his own
special protection units. Many other Anglophone countries have established
similar units, though these have varied from country to country and period to
period. 
Today, formal Presidential/Republican Guards are rare in Anglophone African
countries. However, in practice, a few countries, including the Gambia, Nigeria
and Zimbabwe have specialised brigades within the army, known as the Brigade
of Guards, which provides protection for the President. Arguably, Francophone
countries differ mainly in that PGs have been more uniform and more
institutionalised. 
4.1.2.3 The National Guard 
Contrary to Sahelian Francophone countries, the National Guard is not a common
practice in Anglophone Africa. Nigeria under military rule experimented with the
idea of a National Guard in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but this was quickly
abandoned.
4.1.2.4 The military justice
In Anglophone countries under military rule, military justice was dispensed through
the use of special military tribunals, which were ad hoc arrangements for the trial
of specific offences committed by men and officers of the military. With the
transition to democracy, military justice has become an important concern for
security governance in terms of military discipline and the human rights of military
personnel. In most Anglophone countries, the use of military tribunals for
treasonable offences has become a thing of the past, though the court martial
system for lesser offences is still in place. It has been observed that the most
significant change has been the replacement of the president of a court martial by
a judge with a law degree and experience in either criminal or military justice. In
addition, judges are now more independent and less subject to the influence of
military command, and accused persons can now appeal against the decision of
the military court. The review of the case is done by an independent civilian court
with a civilian judge presiding (Heinecken et al. 2003).
In a number of the Francophone countries (such as Mali and Senegal), military
justice has also experienced significant and fundamental reform since the dawn of
51 Police forces in British colonies were paramilitary: post-colonial policing in Anglophone Africa has not
only continued with this tradition but has witnessed an intensification of this militarisation. The practice
of police under colonial rule was not only maintained, but was strengthened and converted into agents
of particular regimes as well as tools for political intimidation and regime survival. The old colonial
paramilitary methods of crime control were maintained in many of the new states, particularly those
with a history of military rule such as Nigeria, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
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democracy. However, the reform of military justice is still a key challenge in most
of the Francophone countries. 
4.1.2.5 Development missions for the armed forces
Armies endowed with developmental missions are not a common practice in
Anglophone Africa, contrary to Francophone Africa. In most of the Anglophone
countries, the constitution typically specifies a secondary role for the armed forces
to provide military aid to civil authority in periods of national emergency. An
exception is Zambia where soldiers are given not only military training but also
agricultural skills to assist in food production.
4.1.3 Police forces
It is worth noting that both in Francophone and Anglophone African countries, the
police forces have been more than often instruments of political misuse. In most
African countries, police forces have been treated as inferior to the military both in
status and resources. Under-resourcing is a common trend in Africa and has
resulted in the inability of the police to grapple with public insecurities arising from
high crime rates and serious internal security threats (Anderson and Killingray
1992). The consequent loss of public confidence in the police has led to the de-
legitimisation of the public police and recourse to the military (resulting in a
blurring of internal and external security functions) and/or to privatised sources of
security and protection such as corporate security companies and vigilantes.
Consequently, reforming and enhancing the operational capabilities of the police
forces are top priorities in both Francophone and Anglophone countries. 
However, it is paramount to address the reforms taking into account the very
different organisational frameworks of policing in Francophone and Anglophone
Africa. Indeed, one of the defining differences between Francophone and
Anglophone states relies in large part on the kind of security forces which are
responsible for the maintenance of internal order. In Francophone states, in addition
to the police forces (the national and in some countries the municipal police), it was
seen that the gendarmerie forces and the National Guard, besides their role in
ensuring external security, are also entitled to intervene in internal order. 
In Anglophone Africa, all police forces are nationally controlled (Hills 2000, 2007)
i.e. they have a central command at the national level. Most police forces are
therefore territorially organised into national headquarters, provincial, divisional
and district commands. However, the different specialised functions of policing
determine the organisation of the police. While the regular police enforce the law
and work to prevent, detect and fight crime, paramilitary police concentrate on the
preservation of public order.51 The paramilitary police, commonly known as the
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Police Mobile Unit or the Police Mobile Force, are present in many countries,
including Botswana, Malawi, Nigeria (the Police Mobile Force), Mauritius, Malawi
and Lesotho. Paramilitary police forces are known as the General Service Units in
Kenya, the Police Intervention Unit in the Gambia, and the Rapid Response Unit
in Uganda: personnel of these specialised police are drafted from the regular
police and given special training. These mobile units can be compared to the CRS
of the police forces and to the mobile units of the gendarmerie in Francophone
countries. In some cases, paramilitary police are deployed together with the
military in internal operations during periods of disorder. In some countries, such
as Nigeria, paramilitary police forces have access to hard military weapons,
including helicopter gunships and armoured personnel carriers. Paramilitary
policing has therefore been the hallmark of policing in Anglophone Africa,
particularly when it comes to dealing with serious internal crises. 
This militarisation of policing is very similar to situations in Francophone countries
where the armed forces are deployed to deal with internal order disruptions
without any procedures governing their deployment in aiding the civil (police)
police units: in the two sets of countries, there is confusion between external and
internal security functions. On the contrary, Anglophone paramilitary police forces
definitely cannot be compared to the gendarmerie forces. In Anglophone
countries, the military units with predominantly internal security responsibilities
and/or police units equipped for crisis response or paramilitary functions do exist
in a great diversity of forms. But they fundamentally differ from the Francophone
gendarmeries in that the Gendarmerie is permanently constituted and
institutionalised under its own statutes and operates – in principle at least – within
the parameters of the legal system. 
Finally, there are no counterparts to the municipal police forces that can be found
in a number of Francophone countries. However, the practice of ‘proximity policing’
developed by the Francophone municipal police may be interestingly compared to
the practice of ‘community policing’ developed by Anglophone police forces. 
4.1.4 The intelligence services
As in Francophone countries, intelligence services are difficult to research in
Africa, given the tradition of secrecy with which the sector is governed. However,
some SSR experts have dealt thoughtfully with intelligence services in Southern
Africa (Afrika and Mlombile 2001; Hutton 2007). Generally, intelligence structures
in Anglophone Africa are organised around a tripod of domestic civilian
intelligence, commonly known as the Security Service, an external civilian
counterpart, commonly known in many countries as the National Intelligence
Agency or Secret Service (South Africa); and a defence intelligence structure. 
In many countries, the civilian components of intelligence are under the control of
the National Security Agency in the Presidency, while defence intelligence forms
part of the military organisation. Again, post-apartheid South Africa is an
exception, with a portfolio Ministry for Intelligence which is responsible for civil
control of the sector.
Apart from this broad categorisation, each of the security services has its own
intelligence structures in many countries, such as army intelligence, police
52 The standard liberal mechanism for public expenditure management has been well articulated by the
World Bank (World Bank 1998). 
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intelligence, etc. The proliferation of intelligence services poses a challenge for
coordination in the sector, and South Africa has made the greatest effort towards
overcoming this challenge by setting up the National Intelligence Coordinating
Committee (NICOC).
4.1.5 Funding provisions
As in Francophone countries, funding for the security sector in Anglophone Africa
is provided for in the overall Public Expenditure Management framework
regulating the funding of the public sector. Thus, at least in theory, ministries in the
security sector are funded from the national budget just as other Ministries,
Departments and Agencies (MDAs). As provided in constitution and legal
frameworks in all countries, the budgetary process is modelled after the liberal
Western standard practice, which starts with Formulation from the Ministry of
Finance (MoF) through Approval, implementation, and Reporting and Auditing, by
the Auditor General.52 While the legal framework may exist in theory, what
happens in practice is often entirely different: as in Francophone Africa, the real
experience of Anglophone Africa shows that the civil supervision of the resources
of security forces is problematic. With the exception of South Africa, adherence to
the principles of public expenditure management tends to be generally low.
However, in some Anglophone countries, security budgeting processes have
improved in two respects: 
z With the transition to democracy and constitutional rule in Anglophone
countries in the 1990s, supervision of the resources of the security sector has
been anchored in law and the constitution;
z Sector-wide budgets for security have been introduced in some Anglophone
countries. 
4.1.6 Research on Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Contrary to Francophone Africa, research and advocacy capacities on SSR have
been increasingly networked and structured in Anglophone Africa. The most
important research centres are: the ISS (Institute for Security Studies) in South
Africa, the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) (Ghana), the Centre
for Democracy and Development (CDD) (Nigeria), the Southern African Defence
and Security Management Network (SADSEM) in South Africa, the Centre for
Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD) (Ethiopia), and the Security Research and
Information Centre (SRIC) (Kenya). Furthermore, a pan-African organisation, the
ASSN (African Security Sector Network) is bringing together the resources and
expertise of those different centres, aiming to create an African network of SSR
networks. The ASSN was created out of recognition of the need to harmonise the
various African organisations carrying out activities in the general area of security
sector reform/transformation/governance (SSR/SST/SSG). 
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4.1.7 Military schools and police academies in Anglophone Africa
The most basic military school in Anglophone Africa is the Military (or Defence)
Academy. This is the entry point to the military for the most junior officers as
cadets for all three services, and it provides undergraduate university education
and professional military development for career-orientated officers. Military
academies exist in all countries in the region. Apart from the military academy,
each of the three services has its own training schools to meet the specialised
operational needs of its officers and men. 
The Command and Staff School (CSC) is at a higher level than the military
academy. This is also a joint service training institution which offers increased
capacity for academic and professional training of middle-level military officers.
CSCs are in a number but not all of the Anglophone countries; they usually run
comparative courses for officers from other countries. At the highest level of
training is the War (Defence) College, which provides defence related education,
training and development services at the most strategic level. These services
include war simulation, peacekeeping training, research and development. Usually
it serves to prepare selected senior military officers and their civilian counterparts
for high level policy, command and staff functions.
With regards to police training, there are three main types of police school in
Anglophone African countries. At the lowest level are Police Training Centres for
training constables. These are common within particular countries and form the
entry point for new recruits. At the next level is the Police College for cadet
inspectors, who are upper junior level officers. The highest level is the Police
Academy, for training Cadet Assistant Superintendents. In most countries, there is
only one Police Academy. 
In addition, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, located in
Accra (Ghana), trains and prepares the Peacekeeping Force Headquarters
(Commanders and their staff – military and civilian) at the operational level of
command, to operate effectively and cohesively as a National or Regional Force
Headquarters or as part of an international coalition Force Headquarters in the
current Peacekeeping environment. Such a school can be seen as a counterpart
to the Francophone ENVR. 
5 Recommendations 
The general principles of SSR, mostly inspired by standards formulated in
Anglophone environments, are no doubt relevant to Francophone Africa as well.
However, for SSR programmes to be efficient in Francophone Africa, there is a
need to recognise that, beyond sharing a common language, the majority of
Francophone African States share a specific model from an institutional,
organisational and procedural standpoint. Today, the major international actors
involved in SSR acknowledge that the peculiarities of French-speaking African
environments have not been sufficiently taken into account in the original
conceptualisation of SSR as well as the implementation of policies on the ground.
A thorough knowledge of these features is consequently necessary to ensure the
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success of reforms in Francophone Africa, both in post-conflict environments and
conflict prevention strategies. In addition, SSR is a concept often overlooked by
national actors in Francophone Africa; reforms in a number of Francophone
countries are most often carried out sparsely, in the absence of a comprehensive
and coherent approach. 
The purpose of this final section is to suggest ways that are likely to improve SSR
programmes implemented in Francophone African countries, taking into account
their specific organisational structures and management. The overarching
objective is consequently to highlight the specificities that any SSR programmer
(especially within multilateral organisations such as the UN, the African Union, the
European Union and the OECD) might be aware of when intervening in
environments with specific traditions and backgrounds. 
1 First, SSR programmers must recognise that some key challenges in
undertaking SSR processes in Francophone environments are occurring
directly as a result of the differences existing with Anglophone security
systems: a number of security reforms – mostly technical in essence – should
support the emergence of an approach of SSR, based on a thorough
knowledge of the local context and sensitive to the particularities of the
institutional, organisational and legal environments that can be found in
Francophone Africa.
z First, it is paramount as well to capitalise – through systematic lessons
learned – all the expertise accumulated by the French technical coopérants
(defence, police, justice), exploring both the lessons that can be drawn from
positive experiences but also – and maybe above all – from negative
experiences; 
z Police reform is clearly the major challenge. There is a need to develop the
skills of police forces taking into account their organisational and functional
specificities, particularly the divisions between national police forces,
gendarmerie forces and municipal police forces. Specifically with regards to
the gendarmerie forces, there is a need to envision the potentialities offered
by flexible police forces that can deploy under military or civilian rule,
including its implications for the size and shape of the security sector (as it
might imply a smaller, more highly skilled force). It is also crucial to clarify
the role of Ministries of the Interior/Internal Affairs, many of whom oversee
a range of police forces (including the gendarmeries). The challenge of
managing a structure that includes gendarmerie, public order police and
police judiciaire services cannot be underestimated; 
z As regards the armed forces, it is important to urge Francophone states to
normalise the status of their Presidential Guards;
z In an important number of Francophone countries, it would also be
desirable to enact legislations aimed at regulating the activities of the
private security companies; 
2 Second, a number of reforms – mostly aimed at fostering security governance
– could be inspired by some positive experiences and practices in Anglophone
countries, which have contributed to greater accountability and democratic
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governance of the security sector in accordance with the rule of law in respect
of human rights. It would be advisable to adopt the following measures: 
z Supporting the setting up of collegial decision-making organisations in the
Francophone states, both at the strategic level (NSC-type structures) and
at the operational level (Defence and police council-type structures); 
z Promoting civilian control within the executive branch by urging African
Francophone states to integrate further civilians into the decision-making
bodies of the Ministries of Defence (including promoting civilian control
within the executive branch by setting up a civilian counterpart to the
CEMA (Chief of Defence Staff)); 
z Setting up structures inspired by the South African National Intelligence
Coordinating Committee (NICOC) to oversee the activities of the
intelligence services; 
z Anchoring the supervision of the resources of the security sector in law and
the constitution and developing a sector wide budget for security, as has
been done in some Anglophone African countries. There is also a need to
assess the number of people employed in the defence sector accurately.
This is quite important, as it has budgetary implications as well as oversight
implications. 
3 Finally, to harmonise best practices and security governance on the African
continent as a whole, there is clearly a dire need to develop interactions
between Anglophone and Francophone African countries by:
z Developing common trainings for the armed and security forces of
Anglophone and Francophone countries, particularly within training schools
with a regional or continental vocation; 
z Developing good practice exchanges between African Francophone
countries on the one hand, but also between Francophone and
Anglophone countries which can be considered as having a good record in
terms of security governance (for instance, by Organising at the AU level
good practice exchanges between practitioners); 
z Supporting the intensification of interaction between African
parliamentarians across linguistic boundaries to enable them to enjoy the
prerogatives they are endowed with by the Constitutions. In order to
strengthen the supervision and oversight role of Francophone Parliaments
as well as Anglophone Parliaments, there is a need to conceptualise and
implement programmes that aim to bring together, on a sub-regional (REC)
and cross-regional basis, training seminars and workshops for
parliamentarians with various and uneven experiences in SSR of
parliamentary oversight (best practice exchanges); 
z Encouraging the Africanisation of African expertise and supporting the
emergence of a pan-African SSR expertise by encouraging the integration of
Francophone African research and assessment capacities into the framework
of the existing strong centres and networks which have been working on SSR-
related issues for 20 years or so in Anglophone African countries. 
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6 Conclusion
The time is ripe to share and build upon the experience of both Francophone and
Anglophone Africa within shared policy frameworks/concerns, either by extending
the theory and practice of SSR to Francophone countries, or through other less
intrusive forms of experience sharing. Yet institutional variations matter and have
to be understood and built into policy and practice on SSR. The general principles
of SSR are without doubt relevant to Francophone Africa as well. However, for
SSR programmes to be efficient in Francophone Africa, a thorough knowledge of
institutional and organisational features of Francophone African countries is
necessary to ensure the success of security reforms, both in post-conflict
environments and in conflict prevention strategies.
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Annex: Military schools in
Francophone Africa
Country Town ENVR Acronym
Senegal Thies Infantry Application School EAI
(Ecole d’Application de 
l’Infanterie)
Senegal Thies Active Officers National School ENOA
(Ecole nationale des Officiers 
d’Active)
Senegal Oukam Mobile Gendarmerie CPGM
Improvement Centre (Centre 
de perfectionnement de la 
gendarmerie mobile)
Mali Koulikouro Military Administration EMA
School (Ecole militaire 
d’administration)
Mali Koulikouro General Staff School (Ecole EEM
d’état-major)
Mali Bamako Peacekeeping School (Ecole EMP
de maintien de la paix)
Gabon Libreville General Staff School (Ecole EEM
d’état-major)
Benin Ouidah Demining and Depollution CPADD
Centre (Centre de 
perfectionnement aux 
techniques de déminage et 
de dépollution)
Benin Porto-Novo ‘Police judiciaire’ Improvement CPPJ
Centre (Centre de 
perfectionnement de la police 
judiciaire)
Niger Niamey Paramedical Staff School EPPAN
(Ecole des personnels 
paramédicaux)
Togo Lomé Health Service School (Ecole ESSAL
du service de santé)
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou Military Technical School EMTO
(Ecole militaire technique)
Cameroon Awae Law Enforcement Improvement CPTMO/ 
Centre (Centre de EIFORCES
perfectionnement aux 
techniques de maintien de 
l’ordre) to become EIFORCES
Cameroon Garoua Aeronaval Training Centre PANVR
(Pôle aéronautique à vocation 
régionale)
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